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Abstract
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic
timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different
for local first- or second-mover advantages, which we analyse in turn. When there is a local
second-mover advantage, the players may conduct a war of attrition with stopping rates
that we characterize in terms of the Snell envelope from the general theory of optimal
stopping, which is very general but provides a clear interpretation. With a local first-
mover advantage, stopping typically results from preemption and is abrupt. Equilibria
may differ in the degree of preemption, precisely at which points it is triggered. We
provide an algorithm to characterize where preemption is inevitable and to establish the
existence of corresponding payoff-maximal symmetric equilibria.
Keywords: Stochastic timing games, mixed strategies, subgame perfect equilibrium, op-
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to construct and understand subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric
stochastic timing games, which have important applications, for instance, in strategic real
option models. It is well known that in many timing games in continuous time there exist
no equilibria in pure strategies. If they do exist, however, they typically involve asymmetric
payoffs that only depend on the respective roles of the players, which must be determined
before the game starts. Then there is an unresolved strategic conflict. Here we strive for a
rather general existence result and possibly symmetric payoffs, so we consider mixed strategies.
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In particular, no assumption is made concerning the local incentives, which can move randomly
between first- and second-mover advantages.
Restricting attention to games with a second-mover advantage is known to be helpful for
equilibrium existence. We begin by analyzing that case, too, demonstrating the general payoff
asymmetry in pure-strategy equilibria. Our main contribution for this case is the construction
of mixed strategy equilibria with symmetric payoffs in a possibly general model, making no
specific assumptions concerning the underlyling uncertainty. Nevertheless, the equilibrium
strategies have a clear characterization and interpretation, using the concept of the Snell
envelope from optimal stopping theory. Specifically, we can describe the stopping rates that
make a player indifferent to stay in the game when forgoing a profitable local payoff. Due to
the possible uncertainty, the tradeoffs can be all in expected terms. Since we are not assuming
any kind of smoothness or monotonicity of the underlying payoff processes, we also generalize
existing results for purely deterministic models.
With a first-mover advantage, there is often a preemption incentive that leads to equilib-
rium existence problems even with mixed strategies in very simple, completely well-behaved
deterministic models.1 One needs to extend strategies to model preemption appropriately in
continuous time, which requires some coordination mechanism (not to be confused with public
correlation). As there is no respective “next period”, the players have to be able to ensure
that the game ends instantaneously regardless, but without simultaneously stopping to occur
with probability 1. We use the generalization of the concept of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
to stochastic models provided in Riedel and Steg (2014), which gives us preemption equilibria
that correspond to symmetric mixed equilibria in discrete time. These can be combined with
the previous equilibria for local second-mover advantages with continuous strategies, to obtain
a general existence and characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria with symmetric payoffs
without any restriction on the order of payoff processes.
These equilibria now allow for richer models of strategic real options, for instance, which
typically focus on preemption. In the latter case one needs to ensure that waiting until
preemption starts is optimal, however, which may hold in a specific model or requires a
particular assumption.2 Here we may have some continuous stopping beforehand.
Depending on the profitability of future continuation equilibria, preemption does not have
to be triggered just because there is a local first-mover advantage. As the term says, preemp-
tion destroys future continuation payoffs; so the less often preemption occurs, the higher the
resulting equilibrium payoffs. To determine at which times preemption is indeed inevitable,
we provide an algorithm working under the additional assumption that simultaneous stopping
is generally the worst outcome (weakly). Then we find that in any equilibrium with symmetric
1See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and Hendricks and Wilson (1992).
2See Riedel and Steg (2014) on such properties. For a strategic investment model where both preemption
and attrition situations can arise see Steg and Thijssen (2015).
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payoffs in every subgame, the equilibrium payoff can never exceed the expected value of opti-
mally stopping the minimum of the local leader and follower payoffs. That means, no matter
how the players mix, possibly even with arbitrary public correlation and independently of
infinite remaining time, they can never benefit from a high value of the underlying payoff
processes if that is not attained by both the leader and follower payoffs simultaneously.
Then we know that the game has to end by preemption whenever the leader payoff exceeds
the equilibrium payoff bound. Iterating this procedure cumulates in the identification of times
when preemption cannot be avoided. Confining preemption to those times, we obtain an
equilibrium with least sustainable preemption and highest possible payoffs.
1.1 Main theorems
We use the formal concept of subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for timing
games developed in Riedel and Steg (2014), who argue that subgames are appropriately iden-
tified by stopping times (the latter are feasible decision nodes, but cannot be represented by
considering deterministic times only). Mixed strategies take the form of distribution functions
over time, that can react to the dynamic exogenous information about the state of the world.
We further apply the mentioned strategy extensions for preemption regimes. Uncertainty may
affect the underlying payoffs, but may also (just) represent public correlation devices. Given
that framework, this paper develops three main Theorems 5.3, 7.3 and 8.2, which build on
each other.
Theorem 5.3 constructs subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for games with
a systematic (weak) second-mover advantage. Therefore the players have to coordinate on
an appropriate payoff process, which consists of the leader payoff up to some feasible point,
where there is either a simultaneous stopping equilibrium, or which is sufficiently late such
that both players will then have stopped for sure. The equilibrium proceeds by optimally
stopping this fixed process. As long as there are expected gains, no player stops. If a point is
reached, however, where it would be strictly optimal to stop – i.e., any delay would imply a
loss – then there has to be a compensation in terms of some probability to obtain the higher
follower payoff. We characterize the exact rate that the respective opponent has to use to
make each player indifferent at such points.
Owing to its generality, this result is technically not as clear as its interpretation. With
typical Brownian models, for instance, one cannot apply local arguments as there is no path
monotonicity at all. Consequently, it is then also not possible to distinguish proper time
intervals on which mixing occurs – imagine a Brownian motion fluctuating around the bound-
ary of the region where mixing indeed takes place. Nevertheless, using martingale arguments
we obtain a clear representation of strategies involving the concept of Snell envelope from
the theory of optimal stopping, which allows us to speak meaningfully of a (local) expected
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loss, for instance. These strategies will typically be continuous up to some terminal jumps.
Another important question is then time consistency. If we define mixed strategies for all sub-
games, i.e., stopping times, we have to ensure that they imply consistent conditional stopping
probabilities throughout the game, which is generally not trivial.
Theorem 7.3 then makes use of the mentioned strategy extensions, which allow us to pro-
vide symmetric preemption equilibria for regimes with a first-mover advantage. The theorem
establishes that they form feasible continuation equilibria when leaving regimes with second-
mover advantages. In aggregate we thus obtain payoff-symmetric equilibria for games without
any restriction on the local incentives. There may be arbitrary, random alternations of first-
or second-mover advantages.
Theorem 8.2 determines efficient symmetric equilibria. While the previous ones involve
extreme preemption – whenever there is a strict first-mover advantage – we now identify
equilibria with least sustainable preemption, resulting in the highest feasible payoffs. For that
purpose we focus on payoff-symmetric equilibria, with symmetric payoffs in every subgame,
since this property has important implications for equilibrium strategies. Roughly, conditional
stopping probabilities can only differ when players are currently indifferent to become leader
or follower. With the additional assumption that simultaneous stopping is not strictly better
than leading or following, in equilibrium the players can coordinate at most on optimally
stopping the minimum of the leader and follower payoff processes. Whenever the leader
payoff exceed that value, there must be preemption. Knowing this restricts the relevant
stopping times in the previous problem, which further reduces the attainable value. Iterating
the procedure formally as an algorithm identifies inevitable preemption points.
Theorem 8.2 establishes that we do obtain a well-defined equilibrium in the end, not only a
limit value. It is based on the previous equilibria, but suppressing preemption where possible.
The main problem is to show that there remain proper equilibria where preemption does take
place, and that we indeed have well measurable, time-consistent strategies when applying the
proposed algorithm to all subgames.
1.2 Related literature
Strategic timing problems appear in an abundance of contexts, in particular in economics but
also in biology, e.g., and there is a vast related literature.
On the one hand there is a branch on deterministic timing problems in continuous time
addressing a wide range of applications, where typically a distinction is made between pre-
emption models and wars of attrition. Correspondingly, Hendricks and Wilson (1992) and
Hendricks et al. (1988) study stylized models with systematic first- and second-mover advan-
tages, respectively. A war of attrition appears in Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) who consider
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exit from a declining industry.3 In a seminal contribution, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) em-
phasize subgame-perfection in a symmetric preemption game. Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube
(2005) model a similar technology adoption game, allowing the leader payoff function to
be multi-peaked while restricting the follower payoff to be nonincreasing.4 Without uncer-
tainty, these games proceed quite linearly due to perfect foresight. More complications arise
when the incentives may vary more freely. Laraki et al. (2005) consider general deterministic
N -player games with payoffs that are just continuous functions of time (for given identities
of first-movers). They prove that there do always exist ε-equilibria, but not necessarily exact
equilibria.
On the other hand there is also a wide branch of the literature considering (continuous-
time) timing games with uncertainty. Dutta and Rustichini (1993), e.g., formulate a symmetric
Markovian setting. However, restricting themselves to pure strategies, their Markov perfect
equilibrium payoffs are generally asymmetric.
Important applications with uncertainty are strategic real options. An early contribution
is Smets (1991). A typical symmetric model of preemptive investment is that of Mason and
Weeds (2010).5 Weeds (2002) considers strategic irreversible R&D investment, while Murto
(2004) studies exit from a duopoly.
Finally, as we emphasize uncertainty, the literature on Dynkin games with its large tradi-
tion has to be named. As these are two-person, zero-sum timing games, the classical question
is the existence of an equilibrium saddle point, or value, under varying conditions. We here
just refer to the more recent work by Touzi and Vieille (2002), since their payoff processes
are very general and – more importantly – since they introduce another concept of mixed
strategies (but without consideration of subgames). Touzi and Vieille (2002) prove that many
more Dynkin games have a value if one allows for such mixed strategies.
Recently, also some more abstract work considering stochastic timing games with non-
zero-sum payoffs has been conducted. Hamadène and Zhang (2010), e.g., prove existence of
Nash equilibrium for 2-player games with a general second-mover advantage.6
3Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) analyse a market exit problem with incomplete information. Bulow and
Klemperer (1999) consider a similar problem with more than two firms.
4Some implication of F being a supermartingale will be discussed here in Section 4. Dutta et al. (1995)
obtain again a similar structure as Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) (including the single-peakedness assumption)
from a model of product differentiation.
5Pawlina and Kort (2006) consider a similar model with asymmetric investment costs and Thijssen (2010)
one with firm-specific uncertainty. Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) model preemption with incomplete infor-
mation.
6See also Hamadène and Hassani (2014) for an extension to N players using a similar approach. Laraki and
Solan (2013) make less assumptions concerning the incentives in a 2-player game. Consequently, even allowing
for mixed strategies, they can only prove existence of ε-equilibria.
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1.3 Outline
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define our timing games, making only
minimal regularity assumptions, and we introduce the concept of subgame-perfect equilibria
in mixed strategies as developed in Riedel and Steg (2014).
Although we are generally working with mixed strategies, equilibrium verification is re-
lated to solving optimal stopping problems by linearity, for which we establish a convenient
representation in Section 3. There we also present the needed facts from the general theory of
optimal stopping. On the one hand, strategies will be represented by the Snell envelope, which
we motivate. On the other hand, in our games we have to be quite careful about existence of
optimal stopping times, which depends strongly on path properties of the involved processes,
so we will address some details.
By a first application of this theory in Section 4 we establish equilibria in pure strategies
and argue that they typically generate coordination problems. These are resolved in Section 5
by the construction of subgame-perfect equilibria in mixed strategies, in a first step for games
with a systematic second-mover advantage. Although our representation of the equilibrium
strategies can be well interpreted, we derive a completely explicit equilibrium for a market
exit example in Section 6.
In Section 7 we use the mentioned strategy extensions to obtain equilibria in regimes with
first-mover advantages, which then enables us to construct and characterize subgame-perfect
equilibria for arbitrary symmetric stopping games. Finally we identify equilibria with maximal
payoffs and least possible preemption in Section 8. Section 9 concludes. The appendix contains
some technical results and the proofs.
2 The timing game
We use the framework for subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies developed in Riedel
and Steg (2014), where the concepts summarized in this section are explained in more detail.
Here we only consider symmetric games, which allows some simplifications incorporated in
the following.
The timing game consists of two players i = 1, 2, who each decide when to stop in continu-
ous time t ∈ [0,∞]. However, there is uncertainty about the state of the world, modeled by a
probability space (Ω,F , P ). The partial information about the true state evolves exogenously
over time, represented by a filtration (Ft)t≥0. The player’s stopping decisions may of course
use this information, so a feasible plan is in principle a stopping time; see Section 2.1 for the
formal definition of strategies.
As usual in timing games, we focus only on situations (resp. histories) in which no player
has stopped, yet. Therefore, the game ends as soon as any of the players stops. A player who
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is the single one to stop first is called the leader. In this case the other player becomes the
follower. Their respective payoffs are determined by the two stochastic processes L and F .
Both processes incorporate the possible effect of an (optimal, contingent) stopping decision
that the follower might have in a more primitive model, given that the opponent has already
stopped – as in Example 2.3 below. If the game ends by both players stopping simultaneously,
their payoffs are determined by the third process M . All processes are measured in the same
numeraire, say, discounted to time 0, and the players are risk neutral.7
Equilibria will obviously be based on solving optimal stopping problems involving the
three underlying payoff processes. We need to make some weak regularity assumptions in
order to have well defined problems in the following.
Assumption 2.1.
(i) (Ω,F , P ) is a fixed probability space equipped with a filtration F =
(
Ft
)
t≥0 satisfying
the usual conditions (i.e., F is right-continuous and complete).
(ii) The processes L, F and M are adapted, right-continuous (a.s.) and of class (D), M
having an extension with E[|M∞|] <∞.
(iii) min(L,F ) is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation, in fact on [0,∞] if we
put L∞ = F∞ = M∞.
Remark 2.2.
(i) The payoff processes L, F and M do not have to be random; deterministic ones are just
a special case. Even then the probability space and filtration might be nontrivial and
represent possible public randomization devices. The current payoffs at any time t just
should be known by the public information Ft.
(ii) Two important general technical issues are measurability, in particular concerning strate-
gies that we address below, and integrability. We need to ensure that expectations are
always well defined and that pointwise converging random variables converge in expec-
tation, too. Class (D) is the possibly weakest integrability condition we can work with.8
Boundedness would be much too strong for many applications (e.g., involving Brownian
motion).
7Alternatively, one can interpret the payoff processes as measured in discounted “utils”.
8A measurable process X is of class (D) if the family {Xτ : τ < ∞ a.s. a stopping time} is uniformly
integrable. Then the family is bounded in expectation and pointwise convergence ofX at a stopping time implies
convergence in L1(P ) as well. This is a mild regularity condition implied, e.g., by either E[supt |Xt|] < ∞ or
supτ E[|Xτ |p] < ∞ for some p > 1. We may equivalently define any X∞ ∈ L1(P ) and consider all stopping
times (possibly taking the value ∞) in the previous set; cf. Lemma A.1.
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(iii) It depends on the model whether there is a natural payoff if both players “never stop”,
which may be some limit of M or of L. In the latter case we simply set M∞ := L∞ and
work with M∞ for a unified payoff notation. For convenience, we also formally define
F∞ := M∞.
(iv) In order to have any general existence results for equilibria, some path regularity of the
payoff processes is necessary, as can be seen clearly even in the deterministic, single
agent case. Nevertheless, it suffices for us to have upper-semi-continuity from the left
only in expectation.9 In optimal stopping problems this property is also needed for
existence. We use it for equilibria in mixed strategies when there is a (local) second-
mover advantage. It is of course only required for L if that never exceeds F . Indeed,
one could restrict attention to intervals
[
τ, inf{t ≥ τ |Lt > Ft}
]
, where τ is a stopping
time; the area {L > F} is only relevant at transitions. The assumption is satisfied, e.g.,
if the paths of L and F are a.s. (upper-semi-)continuous from the left.10
Example 2.3. Let us consider a market exit problem as a simple example for a stochastic
timing game with second-mover advantage, i.e., F ≥ L, like in the classical war of attrition.11
Suppose that two firms are operating in one market such that duopoly returns piD might
not be sustainable in the long run, depending on uncertain exogenous conditions. While each
firm would in general like the opponent to leave the market in order to earn the monopoly
profit piM ≥ piD, it might be too costly to wait for that possibly random event. Each firm
thus decides on times when waiting becomes no longer promising, and at which to leave the
market if the other is still present.
The payoff processes are then:
Lt = Mt :=
∫ t
0
piDs ds,
Ft := Lt + ess sup
t≤τF∈T
E
[∫ τF
t
piMs ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] (2.1)
for all t ∈ [0,∞] (the convention F∞ = M∞ = L∞ here holds naturally). Any monopolist
may drop out at a stopping time τF , since the monopoly return need not be profitable, either;
then immediate exit is the dominant strategy and the second-mover advantage will not be
strict. However, we do not model the strategy of a single remaining firm, but incorporate
the corresponding optimal decision in the payoff processes. The idea of subgame perfection
9Upper-semi-continuity from the left in expectation means E[Lτ ∧ Fτ ] ≥ lim supnE[Lτn ∧ Fτn ] for any
sequence of stopping times (τn) that is a.s. increasing to a stopping time τ .
10Then lim sups↗t(Ls ∧Fs) ≤ (lim sups↗t Ls)∧ (lim sups↗t Fs) ≤ Lt ∧Ft for all t ∈ [0,∞] a.s., and we note
that L and F are of class (D).
11For typical examples of preemption type, see Riedel and Steg (2014).
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requires that the latter be chosen optimally.
Assumption 2.1 is satisfied in this example if piD and piM are adapted and P⊗dt-integrable,
as all processes are then bounded by an integrable random variable. It follows from our
discussion in Section 3.1 below that there exists a right-continuous process F such that the
relation (2.1) holds even when substituting t by a general stopping time τ , which is one of the
most important results in continuous-time stopping.12
2.1 Mixed strategies and equilibrium concept
The concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium for stochastic timing games of Riedel and Steg
(2014) is as follows. The feasible decision nodes in continuous time are all stopping times.
Therefore we consider any stopping time as the beginning of a subgame, with the connotation
that no player has stopped before. Let T denote the set of all stopping times w.r.t. our
filtration F.
We hence specify complete plans of actions for all subgames, taking the form of (random)
distribution functions over time. In order to aggregate strategies for the whole game, one
requires time consistency, meaning that Bayes’ law has to be respected wherever it applies.
Additional strategy extensions are needed for subgames with first-mover advantages, to
model preemption appropriately in continuous time.13 Therefore we use the generalization
of the concept of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to stochastic models developed in Riedel and
Steg (2014) – which preserves the interpretation of discrete-time limits. These extensions are
introduced immediately, although one can abstract from them in the discussion of games with
a second-mover advantage. We will take them up later for general games.
Definition 2.4. An extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} in the subgame starting at
ϑ ∈ T , also called ϑ-strategy, is a pair of processes (Gϑi , αϑi ) taking values in [0, 1], respectively,
with the following properties.
(i) Gϑi is adapted. It is right-continuous and nondecreasing with Gϑi (t) = 0 for all t < ϑ,
a.s.
(ii) αϑi is progressively measurable.14 It is right-continuous where αϑi < 1, a.s.15
12This issue is somewhat more delicate for L if we have an example in which the leader’s payoff also depends
on the stopping time eventually chosen by the follower, as in an entry model. The follower’s decision involves of
course no optimality condition with respect to the leader’s payoff stream, which may make the leader’s payoff
discontinuous from the right in expectation (which optimality exactly prevents for the follower’s payoff). In
general that problem will not arise in diffusion models, however.
13See also Hendricks and Wilson (1992) on (non-)existence of equilibria in deterministic preemption games.
14Formally, the mapping αϑi : Ω × [0, t] → R, (ω, s) 7→ αϑi (ω, s) must be Ft ⊗B([0, t])-measurable for any
t ∈ R+. It is a stronger condition than adaptedness, but weaker than optionality, which we automatically have
for Gϑi by right-continuity. Progressive measurability implies that αϑi (τ) will be Fτ -measurable for any τ ∈ T .
15This means that with probability 1, αϑi (·) is right-continuous at all t ∈ [0,∞) for which αϑi (t) < 1. Since
we are here only interested in symmetric games, we may demand the extensions αϑi (·) to be right-continuous
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(iii)
αϑi (t) > 0⇒ Gϑi (t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, a.s.
We further define Gϑi (0−) ≡ 0, Gϑi (∞) ≡ 1 and αϑi (∞) ≡ 1 for every extended mixed strategy.
Note that we do not require the players to stop in finite time. Then player i may for
instance decide to stop simply at some stopping time τ ≥ ϑ, which is interpreted as a pure
strategy and corresponds to Gϑi (t) = 1t≥τ for all t ≥ 0 (and αϑi = 1t≥∞). If αϑi ≡ 0 on
[0,∞), we loosely speak of a “standard” mixed strategy. Such extended mixed strategies are
completely equivalent to mixed strategies in the analogous model without extensions αϑi .
Definition 2.5. Given two extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
,
(
Gϑj , α
ϑ
j
)
, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
the payoff of player i in the subgame starting at ϑ ∈ T is
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
:= E
[∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑj (s)
)
Ls dG
ϑ
i (s) +
∫
[0,τˆϑ)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
+
∑
s∈[0,τˆϑ)
∆Gϑi (s)∆Gϑj (s)Ms + λϑL,iLτˆϑ + λϑL,jFτˆϑ + λϑMMτˆϑ
∣∣∣∣Fϑ].
At τˆϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) + αϑ2 (t) > 0}, the extensions αϑ· determine final outcome
probabilities λϑL,i, λϑL,j and λϑM . Their definition is given in Appendix C for completeness; it
is a simplification of that in Riedel and Steg (2014), thanks to the slightly stronger regularity
here. Note that if both players reserve some mass for t =∞ (whence τˆϑ =∞, λϑL,i = λϑL,j = 0),
the corresponding payoff will be
(
1 − Gϑi (∞−)
)(
1 − Gϑj (∞−)
)
M∞, since we have defined
Gϑi (∞) = αϑi (∞) = 1.
The pathwise integrals do include possible jumps of the right-continuous integrators at 0,
since player i can become leader/follower from an initial jump of Gϑi /Gϑj , respectively. The
payoffs are indeed well defined under Assumption 2.1 and bounded in expectation – uniformly
across all feasible strategies; cf. Lemma A.2.
To aggregate ϑ-strategies across subgames, time consistency in the form of Bayes’ law has
to hold.
Definition 2.6. An extended mixed strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} in the stopping game is a
family (
Gi, αi
)
:=
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i
)
ϑ∈T
of extended mixed strategies for all subgames ϑ ∈ T .
also where they take the value 0, which simplifies the definition of outcomes. See Section 3 of Riedel and Steg
(2014) for issues with asymmetric games and corresponding weaker regularity restrictions.
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An extended mixed strategy
(
Gi, αi
)
is time-consistent if for all ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ∈ T
ϑ′ ≤ t ∈ R+ ⇒ Gϑi (t) = Gϑi (ϑ′−) +
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ′−)
)
Gϑ
′
i (t) a.s.
and
ϑ′ ≤ τ ∈ T ⇒ αϑi (τ) = αϑ
′
i (τ) a.s.
Note that time consistency implies in particular that for any two subgames ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T we
must have Gϑi ≡ Gϑ
′
i (a.s.) on the event {ϑ = ϑ′}, as one would reasonably expect. The
equilibrium concept is then natural.
Definition 2.7. A subgame-perfect equilibrium for the timing game is a pair
(
G1, α1
)
,
(
G2, α2
)
of time-consistent extended mixed strategies such that for all ϑ ∈ T , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and
extended mixed strategies
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a
)
V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ) ≥ V ϑi (Gϑa , αϑa , Gϑj , αϑj ) a.s.,
i.e., such that every pair
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
is an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ ∈ T ,
respectively.
3 Best replies and optimal stopping
The payoffs in Definition 2.5 are apparently linear in strategies. In this section we derive a
more explicit representation of this linearity, which will be very helpful for rigorous proofs to
verify equilibria, but also for necessity arguments. To determine or verify any best replies,
one needs to maximize over (extended) mixed strategies against these same objects in general,
of course. Here we make related statements such as “any stopping time in the support of the
mixed strategy needs to be optimal” precise. We further introduce the central concepts from
the theory of optimal stopping, notably the Snell envelope, which plays a crucial role in the
following representation and interpretation of mixed strategies in equilibrium.
The following arguments concern the distributions Gϑi , so we neglect the extensions until
Section 7 for simplicity (which formally means restricting to αϑi ≡ 1t≥∞, as mentioned in
Section 2.1, i.e., to “standard” mixed strategies).
Now, for the alternative representation of the payoff of player i ∈ {1, 2} in the subgame
at ϑ ∈ T , we introduce the process Sϑi given by
Sϑi (t) :=
∫
[0,t)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) + ∆Gϑj (t)Mt +
(
1−Gϑj (t)
)
Lt (3.1)
for all t ∈ [0,∞), where Gϑj is a given feasible mixed strategy for the opponent j ∈ {1, 2} \ i.
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Lemma A.3 shows that this process is well behaved: it is optional16 and of class (D). With
M∞ ∈ L1(P ), we can extend the definition of Sϑi in (3.1) to t = ∞ implying also Sϑi (∞) ∈
L1(P ).17
Thanks to Lemma A.2 and Sϑi (∞) ∈ L1(P ), we can integrate Sϑi by any feasible dGϑi to
see that the expected payoff of player i in the subgame beginning at ϑ ∈ T can be written
as18
V ϑi (Gϑi , Gϑj ) = E
[∫
[0,∞]
Sϑi (t) dGϑi (t)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]. (3.2)
As is to be expected by the linearity of (3.2), there exists a best reply only if there is one
that is a pure strategy.
Lemma 3.1. Fix ϑ ∈ T and let Gϑi and Gϑj be feasible. Then
V ϑi (Gϑi , Gϑj ) ≤ ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
Sϑi (τ)
∣∣Fϑ] a.s.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
From the lemma (and more explicitly from its proof) we see that a feasible strategy Gϑi
will be a best reply to Gϑj if and only if for any stopping time τ∗ such that dGϑi (τ∗) > 0,19
E
[
Sϑi (τ∗)
∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[Sϑi (τ) ∣∣Fϑ] ∀ϑ ≤ τ ∈ T
and we generally have to solve the optimal stopping problem on the right in Lemma 3.1.
The central aspect of continuous-time games of timing is their inherent discontinuity, even
if the underlying data (here L, F , and M) is continuous. For instance, from the definition
of Sϑi in (3.1) it is now immediately clear that a best reply cannot put any joint mass points
where F > M , since limε↘0 Sϑi (t+ε)−Sϑi (t) = ∆Gϑj (t)
(
Ft−Mt
)
by right-continuity of L; this
will be a frequent argument. Depending on Gϑj , there need not exist any stopping time that
actually attains the value of the problem, as Sϑi may have various kinds of discontinuities.
Dealing with such discontinuities will be one of our major issues.
In the following subsection we present some crucial facts from the general theory of optimal
16This means that Sϑi is measurable w.r.t. the optional σ-field on the product space Ω × R+, which is
generated by all right-continuous adapted processes, or equivalently by the random intervals [0, τ), τ ∈ T .
17Note that the integral in (3.1) converges, as it is bounded by
∫
[0,∞) |Fs| dGϑj (s) ∈ L1(P ) thanks to Lemma
A.2.
18An application of Fubini’s theorem using footnote 17 yields in particular∫
[0,∞)
(
1−Gϑi (s)
)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) =
∫
[0,∞)
∫
[0,∞]
1t>s dGϑi (t)Fs dGϑj (s)
=
∫
[0,∞]
∫
[0,∞)
1s<tFs dGϑj (s) dGϑi (t) =
∫
[0,∞]
∫
[0,t)
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) dGϑi (t) ∈ L1(P ).
19This means that Gϑi (t) > Gϑi (τ−) for all t > τ a.s.
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stopping in continuous time, providing in particular sufficient (and basically necessary) con-
ditions for the existence of optimal stopping times and their characterization in terms of the
Snell envelope. The latter is in fact our main tool to derive and represent mixed equilibrium
strategies.
3.1 Optimal stopping in continuous time
As a motivating stopping problem to present the theory, consider the unilateral problem
of when to become the leader optimally, i.e., supposing the opponent will never act. This
problem will play an important role in the following.20
It is well established how to characterize the solution of the optimal stopping problem
VL(0) := ess sup
τ∈T
E
[
Lτ
]
given Assumption 2.1. In fact, our payoff process L is right-continuous (hence optional) and
of class (D), such that we can apply the general theory of optimal stopping as in, e.g., Mertens
(1972) and Bismut and Skalli (1977): There exists a smallest supermartingale UL dominating
the payoff process L, called the Snell envelope of L, which satisfies
UL(ϑ) = ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
Lτ
∣∣Fϑ] a.s. (3.3)
for all stopping times ϑ ∈ T . In particular UL(0) = VL(0). We remark that one can very
well define the RHS of (3.3) for any ϑ ∈ T , but the key insight is that there exists a well
behaved process UL =
(
UL(t)
)
t≥0, which one can evaluate at any stopping time ϑ to know
the continuation value there. In view of the dynamic programming principle, we do need to
consider continuation problems at stopping times; the latter are feasible quantities, but much
richer than deterministic times.
Now UL is optional and of class (D) as well21 and such supermartingales have very conve-
nient regularity properties: There exists a Doob-Meyer decomposition22
UL = ML −DL
that we extensively use, with a uniformly integrable, right-continuous martingale23 ML and
a nondecreasing, predictable and integrable process DL. The latter can be interpreted as
measuring the expected loss from stopping too late: If we postpone any stopping to τ ≥ 0,
20To stay in the framework of the game, for finding a (pure) best reply to G0j = 1t≥∞ we have to use the
payoff M∞ for not stopping in finite time. Recall our convention of setting L∞ = M∞, however.
21See Mertens (1972), Théorème T4 for the existence and Théorème T5 and proof for UL being of class (D).
22See Mertens (1972), Théorème T3.
23Therefore, the crucial optional sampling holds: ML(σ) = E[ML(τ) |Fσ] for all σ ≤ τ ∈ T . Further, ML
has a last element ML(∞) to which it converges in L1(P ).
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then we cannot achieve more than E[UL(τ)] = UL(0) − E[DL(τ)], even if we stop optimally
from τ onwards.
Reflecting the dynamic programming principle, the value process UL is a martingale as long
as there still exists a future time τ giving at least the same value in expectation as stopping
immediately. Whether there exists any optimal stopping time depends on the continuity
properties of DL. If L is upper-semi-continuous in expectation (as by Assumption 2.1 (iii) if
L ≤ F , e.g.), DL has left-continuous paths a.s.24 By right-continuity of L, DL will be even
continuous.25 With DL left-continuous, there exist the optimal stopping times26
τL(ϑ) := inf
{
t ≥ ϑ ∣∣UL(t) = Lt} and τL(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ ∣∣DL(t) > DL(ϑ−)}. (3.4)
They are the respectively smallest and largest stopping times after ϑ ∈ T attaining27
UL(ϑ) = E
[
LτL(ϑ)
∣∣Fϑ] = E[LτL(ϑ) ∣∣Fϑ] a.s. (3.5)
Hence, by optimality it must hold that UL = L a.s. at any point of increase of DL, which
implies28 ∫ ∞
0
(UL(t)− Lt) dDL(t) = 0 a.s. (3.6)
4 Equilibria in pure strategies
In symmetric games with a systematic second-mover advantage F ≥ L, it is straightforward
to identify certain subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies. Player j, say, just has to stop
sufficiently late, such that i will solve the problem of optimally stopping L presented in Section
3.1. We show in this section that such pure strategy equilibria typically entail asymmetric
24See Bismut and Skalli (1977), Théorème II.2 and proof. (Semi-) Continuity in expectation is in general
weaker than the corresponding path property from the left.
Our payoff processes are not necessarily positive. However, if L is optional and of class (D), the same will be
true for its negative part L− := max(−L, 0), which thus has a Snell envelope UL− = ML− −DL− decomposing
into a uniformly integrable right-continuous martingale ML− and an integrable increasing process DL− . Then
ML− −L− ≥ 0, implying L+ML− ≥ 0. Adding the martingale ML− neither affects L being optional, of class
(D), or (semi-) continuous in expectation, nor any optimal stopping times for L.
25See Bismut and Skalli (1977), (2.15), where right-continuity of the payoff process implies in fact Z+ = X.
26Example: L not upper-semi-continuous ⇒ inf{DL > 0} not optimal.
ML
L
DL
ML
L
DL
27See Bismut and Skalli (1977), Théorème II.3.
28If DL is continuous, UL inherits right-continuity from ML. Then, by (3.4), (3.5) and right-continuity of
UL − L, inf{t ∈ R+ |
∫ t
0 1UL−L≥ε dDL > 0} =∞ a.s. for any ε > 0, i.e., UL − L < ε dDL-a.e. with probability
one, implying the claim. (3.6) also holds without right-continuity of UL − L, if L is upper-semi-continuous in
expectation; see Remark B.1 in the appendix.
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payoffs, however. The respective roles of the players have to be determined before the game
starts, and correspondingly who obtains the higher payoff. With mixed strategies that we
will consider thereafter, one can obtain equilibria with symmetric payoffs that do not create
another strategic conflict outside the model.
Stopping sufficiently late to support a pure strategy equilibrium need not be “never” as
in the previous section; whenever it is optimal to stop L, it must not be worthwhile for i to
wait until j stops, in order to become follower then. This will be the case, e.g., if j stops only
at times where F = L – or simply at ∞.
The easiest example is thus Gϑj = 1t=∞ and Gϑi = 1t≥τL(ϑ) for all ϑ ∈ T , or analogously
with τL(·) defined in (3.4). In either case waiting is indeed optimal for j on [0,∞), because
there are expected gains of L on any interval [ϑ, τL(ϑ)], and F dominates L at both τL(ϑ)
and τL(ϑ).
There can also be quite complex patterns based on the same logic, but with players
switching roles across subgames. This can be illustrated best with a little more structure
as in Example 2.3, where the follower’s optimal stopping times will be “sufficiently late” for
an equilibrium. However, the arguments generalize a bit: the exploited properties are that
F ≥ L ≥ M and that F is a supermartingale, i.e., that one becomes follower the sooner the
better. Then stopping before τL(ϑ) is dominated (for any Gϑj ).
Lemma 4.1. Suppose F ≥ L ≥ M and that F is a supermartingale. Fix ϑ ∈ T . For any
feasible Gϑj and stopping time τi ≥ ϑ,
E
[
Sϑi
((
τi ∨ τL(ϑ)
)
+
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[Sϑi (τi) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
and
E
[
Sϑi
(
τL(ϑ)+
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[LτL(ϑ) ∣∣∣Fϑ], a.s.
Both inequalities also hold with τL(ϑ).
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Note that the supermartingale property of F is important for the result, to ensure relatively
high payoffs in case one becomes follower before the optimum of L is reached. It is not sufficient
that there are even strictly better future stopping times for L and that F ≥ L: If Gϑj puts
mass between ϑ and τL(ϑ) where F still dominates L, but where both are very low, then it
may be worthwhile to secure the current payoff Lϑ due to the risk of becoming follower while
waiting for the optimum of L. An alternative condition would be that L is a submartingale
on [ϑ, τL(ϑ)].
In Example 2.3, L =
∫ ·
0 pi
D ds is the duopolists’ payoff process. Then the optimal stopping
times in the follower’s problem are sufficiently late to support an equilibrium: the perspective
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to become follower (monopolist) at a time when immediate exit is optimal has no value, and it
leads to ceding when piD seems an unsustainable loss – at τL(ϑ). Indeed, as a monopolist stops∫ ·
0 pi
M ds with piM ≥ piD, that optimal stopping time satisfies τF (ϑ) ≥ τL(ϑ). Furthermore,
it holds that F = L = M a.s. at τF (ϑ), so in particular simultaneous stopping is feasible
on {τL(ϑ) = τF (ϑ)} by F = M . These properties generate a whole class of equilibria with
varying roles of the players, decided by events C at τL(ϑ).
Proposition 4.2. Suppose F ≥ L ≥ M and that F is a supermartingale. Fix ϑ ∈ T and
consider a stopping time τF (ϑ) ≥ τL(ϑ) a.s., such that at τF (ϑ) we have F = L, and more
specifically F = M on the subset {τF (ϑ) = τL(ϑ)} a.s. – e.g., τF (ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Ft = Mt}.
Then, for any given event C ∈ FτL(ϑ), the pure strategies corresponding to
τ∗1 = τL(ϑ)1C + τF (ϑ)1Cc and τ∗2 = τL(ϑ)1Cc + τF (ϑ)1C
form an equilibrium in the subgame beginning at ϑ.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Equilibria in pure strategies typically involve asymmetric payoffs, for instance if F > L at
τL(ϑ) in those that we have specified. Consequently, there arises a coordination problem before
the start of the game, each player wanting to become follower eventually. This problem is even
aggravated in the equilibria of Proposition 4.2, where the roles may switch across subgames.
For this reason such equilibria are also not easy to aggregate to a subgame-perfect equilibrium:
for each subgame starting at some ϑ ∈ T , an event C ∈ FτL(ϑ) has to be agreed on that
determines the respective roles.
Maybe even more importantly, no player can obtain the preferred follower payoff by taking
or threatening to take a certain action, but only by the threat of taking no action for a longer
time, which has to induce the opponent to stop. Effectively, players compete in the credibility
to take no action. Such problems can be avoided by allowing for mixed strategies, making the
players indifferent about the roles when stopping occurs. This is our topic in the following.
5 Equilibria in mixed strategies
The very universal principle of the Snell envelope allows us to construct equilibria in mixed
strategies in our general setting as well. But we do not only get existence: our equilibrium
strategies can be clearly interpreted like the Snell envelope itself. Recall that the compensator
relates to the expected loss from stopping too late.
The logic of the following equilibria in symmetric games is this. If F ≥ L but without
the other conditions of Lemma 4.1, waiting for future optimal times to stop L may not
be a dominant strategy. Nevertheless, the players have an incentive and the possibility to
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coordinate on not stopping too early, which can be extended until the latest optimal time
τL(ϑ) to stop L. To cross that point, however, any player has to be compensated by some
chance to become follower with F > L, because otherwise any delay would definitely be costly.
Of course the opponent has to be willing to provide that chance, so we identify the appropriate
rate to compensate exactly the impending loss dDL > 0, to make both indifferent.
This principle does not work where L > F , however, when there would be much more
intense stopping due to a preemption incentive (see Section 7). On the other hand, even if we
were considering only games with a global second-mover advantage, there may be equilibria
with even higher (symmetric) payoffs – if simultaneous stopping is feasible and sufficiently
profitable at some future point, precisely where M ≥ F > L. For these reasons we need to
adapt the appropriate payoff process that players can coordinate on.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a subgame beginning at ϑ ∈ T with Fϑ ≥ Lϑ a.s. on {ϑ < ∞},
and another stopping time τϑ ∈ T taking values in [ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |Ft < Lt}] a.s. Define the
payoff process L˜τϑ := 1t<τϑL+1t≥τϑ max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) and as Dτ
ϑ
L˜
the compensator of its Snell
envelope.
Then there exists a payoff-symmetric equilibrium with mixed strategies satisfying
Gϑi (t) = 1− 1t<τϑ exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
(s)
Fs − Ls
)
(5.1)
and
Gϑj (t) = 1− 1t<τϑ exp
(
−
∫ t
ϑ
1Fs>Ls dDτ
ϑ
L˜
(s)
Fs − Ls
)
, (5.2)
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, iff ∆Gϑi (M−F ) ≤ 0 at inf{t ∈ R+ |Gϑi (t) = 1} < τϑ and ∆Gϑi (M−F ) ≥ 0
at τϑ <∞ a.s.
There further exists a symmetric equilibrium with both players using the strategy (5.1) iff
∆Gϑi (M − F ) = 0 a.s. at inf{t ∈ R+ |Gϑi (t) = 1} < τϑ.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
The “endpoint condition” at inf{t ∈ R+ |Gϑi (t) = 1} =: τG,ϑi (1) seems contradictory, but
it plays the following role. First suppose ∆Gϑi (τϑ) > 0, so τ
G,ϑ
i (1) = τϑ and there is a joint
terminal jump. This means that the players coordinate on the terminal payoff Mτϑ , which is
only feasible if Mτϑ ≥ Fτϑ (recall M∞ = F∞ by convention).
Gϑi can indeed jump to 1 before τϑ, where F = L. There we choose Gϑj continuous to
address the case F = L > M , where payoffs are hence symmetric. This choice can only be an
equilibrium, however, if indeed F ≥M . Otherwise j could obtain a higher value by stopping
at τG,ϑi (1) and not supporting the equilibrium earlier on; we could then simply adjust τϑ to
ensure the correct continuation values.
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Finally, Gϑi can reach 1 also continuously (then Gϑj ≡ Gϑi ). This case is one reason why
we write “max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)” in the definition of L˜τ
ϑ , although we require ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0 at
τϑ. Even if ∆Gϑi = 0, the terminal value of L˜τ
ϑ determines the continuation values on which
players coordinate earlier on. Putting Mτϑ regardless would not be correct. Another reason
is that we will indeed obtain continuation equilibria with payoff max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) when we take
up extended mixed strategies in Section 7.
The strategies here are continuous except for terminal jumps. As motivated above and
given the appropriate payoff process L˜τϑ , the opponent’s stopping rate dDτϑ
L˜
/(F − L) makes
each player indifferent when it would seem optimal to secure L· beforehand. That probability
to obtain F· > L· exactly compensates any expected loss from forgoing L·. The resulting
equilibrium payoffs are
V ϑ1 = V ϑ2 = ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
1τ<τϑLτ + 1τ≥τϑ max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ] := U τϑL˜ (ϑ).
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is based on martingale arguments. An important aspect is to
take care of the different kinds of jumps in the strategies and to ensure that the underlying
payoff process L˜τϑ has the necessary properties (e.g., that Dτϑ
L˜
is continuous). Where stopping
happens continuously, it need not have a rate with respect to time dt, however (though it does
in the explicit Brownian example in Section 6); it might only take place on a set of time points
of measure 0.29
The strategies are trivial in the present equilibria – given that the endpoint is feasible –
if either L or F is a (sub-)martingale on [ϑ, τϑ]; then there is no loss from waiting and
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
≡ 0.30
Remark 5.2. It may happen that DL˜ and hence Gϑi has jumps if L is only upper-semi-
continuous from the right (and the left). In the specified equilibria, waiting is always at least
as good as obtaining L and there must be indifference at increases of DL˜. This is of course
not possible with a joint mass point where L > M .31 Theorem 5.1 remains true if instead
L ≡M (e.g., in an attrition model); see Remark B.1.
The equilibria of Theorem 5.1 can deal so far only with subgames satisfying Fϑ ≥ Lϑ.
Therefore, if we want to aggregate them to a subgame-perfect equilibrium, we have to assume
29In this case Gϑi would be a singular measure, which often appear in optimal control of Brownian models.
30Cf. Riedel and Steg (2014), Theorem 3.3, for this case, but also their Section 4.3 concerning issues in
asymmetric games.
31Example: No symmetric payoff equilibrium if L (> M) not right-continuous.
F
L
M
T1 T2
Waiting is strictly optimal for i at t ∈ (T1, T2) if Gj(T2−) > Gj(t), hence
Gi(T2−) = Gi(T1) and Gj(T2−) = Gj(T1) by payoff symmetry, giving a
continuation payoff L(T2) on (T1, T2]. The only symmetric continuation payoff
at T1 is then in (L(T2), L(T1)) from ∆Gi(T1) = ∆Gj(T1) ∈ (0, 1). Waiting is
also strictly dominant on [0, T1), but stopping short of T1 now yields a higher
payoff than stopping at T1.
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F ≥ L for now. Then existence is trivial by setting τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Mt > Ft} for all ϑ ∈ T .
If also F ≥ M throughout, we get the further simplification that we can set τϑ ≡ ∞ and
hence L˜τϑ = L, Dτϑ
L˜
= DL. In the latter case the stopping rates do not depend on ϑ, which
ensures time consistency.
In general, however, we do not preclude the possibility that at some τϑ, max(F,M) > L or
max(F,M) < UL, such that Dτ
ϑ
L˜
6= DL on [ϑ, τϑ]. Then time consistency requires that τϑ will
not be changed if it has not been passed yet: for any two subgames ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T we should have
τϑ = τϑ′ on {ϑ ≤ ϑ′ ≤ τϑ} and vice versa (in summary, τϑ = τϑ′ on {(ϑ ∨ ϑ′) ≤ (τϑ ∧ τϑ′)},
noting that ϑ ≤ τϑ and ϑ′ ≤ τϑ′ a.s.).
We now have the following payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilibria with “standard”
mixed strategies for games with systematic second-mover advantage.
Theorem 5.3. Assume F ≥ L and fix i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. If we have an equilibrium as in
Theorem 5.1 for any ϑ, ϑ′ ∈ T with τϑ = τϑ′ a.s. on {(ϑ ∨ ϑ′) ≤ (τϑ ∧ τϑ′)} – as we do by
setting τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Mt > Ft} ∀ϑ ∈ T , e.g. – then the strategies
(
Gϑ1
)
ϑ∈T and
(
Gϑ2
)
ϑ∈T
form indeed a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
Even if the time-consistency condition for the family {τϑ : ϑ ∈ T } postulated in the
theorem statement holds, we then have a family {Dτϑ
L˜
: ϑ ∈ T } that needs to induce time-
consistent stopping rates (dGϑi )ϑ∈T . This is the main point of Theorem 5.3, given optimality
by Theorem 5.1.
6 Example: Exit from a duopoly
In this section we illustrate the simplification we get with games having a systematic second-
mover advantage, which we pointed out in the context of Theorem 5.1. Specifically, we
determine subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies by explicitly deriving the Snell envelope UL
and its compensator DL for a version of the market exit game in Example 2.3. The stopping
rate during attrition is then represented in terms of a sustained flow of losses from unprofitable
operations.
To specify the model, assume that at each time t, discounted duopoly profits are given by
piDt = e−rt(Yt − c),
where c > 0 is a constant operating cost and revenues (Yt)t≥0 follow a geometric Brownian
motion solving dY = µY dt + σY dB. If either firm becomes monopolist, the profit stream
changes to
piMt = e−rt(mYt − c),
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where m > 1. Each firm can decide to leave the market with accumulated payoff Lt = Mt =∫ t
0 e
−rs(Ys− c) ds, for example if Y gets so low that the revenue does not cover the production
costs. In such a phase the game is a war of attrition if monopoly seems profitable. However,
it may also be optimal to stop immediately in the follower’s problem
Ft = Lt + ess sup
t≤τF∈T
E
[∫ τF
t
e−rs(mYs − c) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft].
The latter problem is a standard exercise under the condition r > max(µ, 0),32 and its unique
solution is to stop as soon as Y falls below the threshold
ym =
β2
β2 − 1
r − µ
r
c
m
<
c
m
,
where β2 is the negative root of the quadratic equation 12σ2β(β − 1) + µβ − r = 0. The value
of the stopping problem can be explicitly expressed as
Ft − Lt = e−rt1Yt>ym
[
mYt
r − µ −
c
r
−
(
Yt
ym
)β2 (mym
r − µ −
c
r
)]
, (6.1)
which shows that F is in fact a continuous process and F = L (= M) ⇔ Y ≤ ym. Hence,
for any equilibrium as in Theorem 5.1, we need τϑ ≥ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≤ ym} for the endpoint
condition. On the other hand, stopping is strictly dominant for a monopolist as soon as
Y ≤ ym, and so it is in duopoly, where revenues can never exceed those in monopoly. Therefore
we can choose τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≤ ym} without loss and it will lead to a symmetric
equilibrium at any ϑ ∈ T as follows.
Since F is a supermartingale for m ≥ 1 and dominates L, it also dominates the Snell
envelope UL of the latter, such that we have F = L ⇒ F = UL = L. Consequently, L˜τϑ
in Theorem 5.1 here is just L stopped at τϑ, and the Snell envelope U τϑ
L˜
coincides with UL
until τϑ. Applying the RHS of (6.1) with m = 1 yields the solution to optimally stopping the
leader (duopoly) payoff:
UL(t) = ess sup
t≤τ∈T
E[Lτ |Ft] = Lt + e−rt1Yt>y1
[
Yt
r − µ −
c
r
−
(
Yt
y1
)β2 ( y1
r − µ −
c
r
)]
.
Applying Ito¯’s lemma shows that the monotone part of the supermartingale UL is just the
drift
dDL = −1Yt<y1 dL = 1Yt<y1e−rt(c− Yt) dt
where immediately stopping L is optimal. With τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Yt ≤ ym} for every ϑ ∈ T ,
32This is also necessary and sufficient for the processes to be of class (D) in accordance with Assumption
2.1. Then −c/r ≤ Lt ≤
∫∞
0 e
−rs |Ys − c| ds ∈ L1(P ) and similarly for F , inserting m.
20
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
= dDL and (6.1) we now have a fully explicit symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium,
with payoffs V ϑi
(
Gϑi , G
ϑ
j
)
= UL(ϑ), respectively.
As ym < y1 < c, we see that dDL is simply the stream of losses resulting from unprofitable
operations. If a duopolist never hoped to become monopolist, these losses would be too large
to keep operating. Here, whenever Y ∈ (ym, y1), both firms are leaving duopoly at a rate that
depends directly on those running losses; it is decreasing in Y . The state may rise next to
the region (y1, c). Then there are still running losses, but the firms suspend mixing because
the option to wait for a market recovery is sufficiently valuable. Thus there is no need for
a compensation. There will typically be alternating periods of continuous and no mixing. If
the state drops to [0, ym], however, the option to wait for market recovery would be worthless
in the face of running losses even if a firm was (sure to become) monopolist, and both firms
quit immediately.
7 Equilibria for general symmetric games
7.1 Preemption with extended mixed strategies
In a preemption situation, i.e., when there is a first-mover advantage L > F , there typically
exist no equilibria in pure strategies in continuous time. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and
Hendricks and Wilson (1992) show that this issue arises when there is an incentive to wait (L
is increasing). If the model is sufficiently regular and the first-mover advantage is strict, then
one may have equilibria in (standard) mixed strategies, with one player stopping immediately
and the other stopping at a sufficient rate, such that the first would not be able to realize the
increase in L. The payoffs are then asymmetric, L and F . However, these equilibria cannot
be extended to the boundary of the preemption region; if L = F , the necessary stopping rate
to support any equilibrium explodes. This observation does not depend on any regularity
conditions, the payoff processes can be arbitrarily smooth and deterministic.
Therefore, if we want to allow for any equilibria where preemption will be set off (or
also symmetric payoff equilibria where L > F ), we need to enrich the strategies. The key
is to facilitate some partial coordination when players try to stop at the same time, but
when simultaneous stopping would be the worst outcome. Hence we make use of the strategy
extensions αϑi from Definition 2.4, which have been introduced in Riedel and Steg (2014) and
which follow in spirit those of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). With these extended strategies
one can capture the continuous-time limits of symmetric, mixed discrete-time equilibria, which
do not suffer from such problems.33
33In discrete time, there can be equilibria with a positive probability of simultaneous stopping even if that is
the worst outcome, because the players can only assign positive probabilities to the single periods; one cannot
circumvent coordination failure by stopping ε after a mass point of the other.
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We then obtain the following equilibria of immediate stopping for subgames with a first-
mover advantage – here for a symmetric game:34
Proposition 7.1 (Riedel and Steg (2014), Proposition 3.1). Fix ϑ ∈ T and suppose ϑ =
inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft} a.s. Then
(
Gϑ1 , α
ϑ
1
)
,
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
defined by
αϑi (t) =

1 if Mt ≥ Ft and t = inf{u ≥ t |Lu > Fu},
1Lt>Ft
Lt − Ft
Lt −Mt else
for any t ∈ [ϑ,∞) and Gϑi = 1t≥ϑ, i = 1, 2, are an equilibrium in the subgame at ϑ.
The resulting payoffs are V ϑi (Gϑi , αϑi , Gϑj , αϑj ) = max(Fϑ,Mϑ).
Remark 7.2. Where L > F ≥ M , the choice of αϑi makes the respective other player indif-
ferent between stopping and waiting, and αϑi (·) is right-continuous, allowing a limit outcome
argument. Where M > F , stopping is of course the unique best reply. In the polar case
Lt = Ft = Mt, there might not be a right-hand limit of 1Lt>Ft Lt−FtLt−Mt , so we set α
ϑ
i (t) = 1. If
the limit does exist, one can use it to make αϑi (·) right-continuous even here, since the players
will be completely indifferent in this case.
If Lϑ = Fϑ > Mϑ, each player becomes leader or follower with probability 12 .35 This is
the same outcome as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) for their smooth, deterministic model.
If Lϑ > Fϑ > Mϑ, however, there is a positive probability of simultaneous stopping, which is
the price of preemption, driving the payoffs down to Fϑ.
7.2 General symmetric equilibria
We can now combine the equilibria we obtained for F ≥ L and L > F , respectively. With
standard mixed strategies, the equilibria for a current second-mover advantage of Theorem
5.1 depend on the “endpoint condition” ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0, e.g., where a preemption regime
begins with both players trying to stop immediately. Proposition 7.1, however, gives us
“continuation” equilibria of immediate stopping at such transitions with payoffs max(F·,M·).
Indeed, if player j uses an extended mixed strategy, the payoff difference for player i between
stopping and waiting where Gϑj jumps to 1 at τˆϑj = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0} changes from
∆Gϑj
(
M − F ) to
∆Gϑj
(
αϑjM +
(
1− αϑj
)
L− F ),
which is nonnegative if αϑj is as in Proposition 7.1. Therefore, this possibility to coordinate
partially in preemption also generates suitable endpoints for attrition regimes where we cannot
have M· ≥ F· before reaching {L > F}.
34The extension to {M > F} is straightforward in the symmetric case.
35Then the lim inf and lim sup in Definition C.1 are both 12 with the strategies of Proposition 7.1.
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Now, for any symmetric stopping game – where the payoff processes L, F and M do not
depend on the individual players – there exists a payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equilib-
rium:
Theorem 7.3. Under Assumption 2.1 there exists a payoff-symmetric subgame-perfect equi-
librium in extended mixed strategies
(
G1, α1
)
,
(
G2, α2
)
given as follows:
Pick i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. For any ϑ ∈ T , set τϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft or Mt > Ft}.
Define Gϑi , Gϑj as in Theorem 5.1 and αϑi = αϑj as in Proposition 7.1.
Further, if the payoff processes are such that for any stopping time τ ∈ T with Lτ = Fτ ,
either Fτ = Mτ or τ = inf{t > τ |Lt > Ft} a.s., then there is a symmetric subgame-perfect
equilibrium using Gϑi from Theorem 5.1 for both i = 1, 2 and any ϑ ∈ T .
Proof: In Appendix B.1.
The idea of these equilibria is virtually pasting the war of attrition that we have on
{F ≥ L} using the continuous strategies by Theorem 5.1 with the preemption equilibria of
immediate stopping on {L > F} by extended mixed strategies as in Proposition 7.1.
By the upper-semi-continuity of Assumption 2.1 (iii), it is during attrition feasible for the
players to coordinate on a future continuation equilibrium with payoffs max(F·,M·). Then
there will be no predictable drop in payoffs from setting off preemption. The corresponding
equilibrium payoffs are
V ϑ1 = V ϑ2 = ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
1τ<τϑLτ + 1τ≥τϑ max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)
∣∣∣Fϑ]
with τϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |Lt > Ft or Mt > Ft} for any ϑ ∈ T .
While the endpoint condition ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0 at τϑ is now replaced by the preemption
continuation equilibria, we still need to ensure the second one, ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≤ 0 at τG,ϑi (1);
the cap τϑ ∧ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Mt > Ft} works generally, but there may also be alternative choices
in more specific cases. The proof of Theorem 7.3 relies of course on those of Theorem 5.1
and Proposition 7.1. The main issue is that the former was formulated in a reduced setting
with “standard” mixed strategies, so we establish a formal relation to the present setting with
extended mixed strategies.
8 Efficient symmetric equilibrium
The equilibria of Theorem 7.3 involve maximal preemption – wherever L > F – and thus
have a relatively simple structure: the game ends as soon as there is a strict first-mover
advantage. Preemption need not be that severe if there are future continuation equilibria
with sufficiently high (expected) payoffs. In this section we identify equilibria with least
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possible preemption, entailing the highest attainable equilibrium payoffs. We focus on the
class of payoff-symmetric equilibria, which are the subgame-perfect equilibria with V ϑ1 = V ϑ2
a.s. at any stopping time ϑ ∈ T . These have strong implications for equilibrium strategies.
Then, in competitive games, whereM is throughout the lowest payoff, equilibrium payoffs are
at most what can be obtained from optimally stopping min(L,F ) – no matter how players mix,
possibly using public correlation (Proposition 8.1). This bound on equilibrium payoffs enables
us then to identify inevitable preemption points: those where the leader payoff L exceeds
any continuation equilibrium payoff. Theorem 8.2 formulates a corresponding algorithm and
establishes the existence of “efficient” subgame-perfect equilibria.
It is quite clear that any stopping on {F > L} must induce the lower payoff L if M is
generally the worst. The basis of our argument is the more subtle result that players also
cannot exploit L > F by mixing in any payoff-symmetric equilibrium, even if they have no
time constraint.
Proposition 8.1. Suppose M ≤ min(L,F ). Then, in any payoff-symmetric equilibrium and
for any ϑ ∈ T , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ≤ UL∧F (ϑ) = ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fϑ],
where we can in fact restrict ourselves to stopping times τ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑi ∨Gϑj ≥ 1}.
The proof of Proposition 8.1 in Appendix B.2 is based on the following important facts for
any payoff-symmetric equilibrium (which do not depend on the assumption M ≤ min(L,F ),
yet): First, the conditional stopping probabilities of the players must be the same on {F 6= L}
(Lemma B.2), since a player who stops with a higher conditional probability also becomes
leader with a higher conditional probability, whereas the other becomes follower on that event.
As one consequence, Gϑ1 and Gϑ2 must then even be identical before they put any mass on
{F = L} (Lemma B.3). As another consequence, on {F 6= L} we can only have simultaneous
jumps. These are only possible if M· ≥ F·, or if preemption occurs with L· ≥ F· > M·. Most
importantly, we cannot have any jumps where F > max(L,M). Finally, the local payoff from
any terminal jump is bounded by max(F,M) (Lemma B.4).
The intuition for Proposition 8.1 is now the following. In any equilibrium, player i must
be willing to wait until any point at which Gϑi < 1, and stop only from there on with the
corresponding conditional probabilities. Consider as such a point the first time at which any
player puts some mass on {F ≥ L}; call it τ˜ . By waiting until τ˜ , player i might become
follower where Gϑj increases earlier on {F < L}. At τ˜ , by definition at least one player is
willing to stop. The corresponding (symmetric) local payoff is clearly Lτ˜ ≤ Fτ˜ if Gϑ1 , Gϑ2 are
continuous; a jump can only occur if indeed Fτ˜ = Lτ˜ , which is also the maximal local payoff
(with the hypothesis M ≤ min(L,F ), we cannot have any jump where Fτ˜ > Lτ˜ as we have
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seen). Finally, it might happen that Gϑi is exhausted on {F < L}, before ever reaching τ˜ .
Then, however, we must have Gϑ1 = Gϑ2 . If they jump to 1, the terminal payoff is at most
F < L; if they attain 1 continuously, this means in the limit becoming follower for sure on
{F < L}. In summary, player i never receives more than min(L,F ) where stopping occurs.
Proposition 8.1 implies that whenever Lϑ > UL∧F (ϑ), we must have Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∨ Gϑ2 (ϑ) = 1
by preemption.36 If there are any such preemption points in the future, they also restrict
the feasible stopping times τ to maximize the expected value of min(L,F ) in Proposition 8.1,
which even further reduces the maximally attainable equilibrium payoff. By iteration we can
identify where preemption is inevitable.
Theorem 8.2. Suppose M ≤ min(L,F ). Then there exists a maximal payoff-symmetric
equilibrium with value
V ϑ1 = V ϑ2 = ess sup
τ∈[ϑ,τ˜(ϑ)]
E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fϑ] := U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(ϑ)
for any ϑ ∈ T , where τ˜(ϑ) is the latest sustainable preemption point after ϑ determined by
the following algorithm:
(i) Set τ0(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |L > UL∧F } and
(L ∧ F )τ0(ϑ) := (Lt∧τ0(ϑ) ∧ Ft∧τ0(ϑ))t≥0
with Snell envelope U(L∧F )τ0(ϑ) =
(
ess supt≤τ∈T E
[
(L ∧ F )τ0(ϑ)τ
∣∣Ft])t≥0.
(ii) For all n ∈ N set τn(ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |L > U(L∧F )τn−1(ϑ)} ∧ τn−1(ϑ) and
(L ∧ F )τn(ϑ) := (Lt∧τn(ϑ) ∧ Ft∧τn(ϑ))t≥0
with Snell envelope U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) =
(
ess supt≤τ∈T E
[
(L ∧ F )τn(ϑ)τ
∣∣Ft])t≥0.
(iii) Take the monotone limit τ˜(ϑ) := limn→∞ τn(ϑ).
Proof: In Appendix B.3.
The payoff-maximal equilibrium is implemented using the strategies of Theorem 7.3, but
setting αϑi = 0 before τ˜(ϑ). Constructing τ˜(ϑ) by the algorithm is technically not difficult.
The main problem is rather to verify the claimed equilibrium properties: to make sure that
there is no preemption incentive where L > F on [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)), that τ˜(ϑ) is indeed maximal, and
that there is a continuation equilibrium of preemption at τ˜(ϑ). Further, measurability is a
36This argument is not impaired by any jump ∆Gϑj (ϑ) ∈ (0, 1) due to which player i could not realize Lϑ.
L is right-continuous, so player i could try to stop right after ϑ. The formal argument is given in the proof of
Theorem 8.2.
25
major technical issue, since we want to have a time-consistent version of the strategies where
we set αϑi = 0 on [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) for all ϑ ∈ T , to achieve the maximal payoff in all subgames.
In order to suppress preemption where Lϑ > Fϑ, it is obviously not sufficient that there
exists τ ≥ ϑ such that E[Lτ ∧ Fτ |Fϑ] ≥ Lϑ; this relation then rather has to hold on all of
[ϑ, τ ] ∩ {L > F}. For instance, the algorithm of Theorem 8.2 can be applied to the model of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) by visual inspection, shown in Figure 1.
t
L
F
M
L,F ,M
T1
τ1 τ0
Tˆ2
Figure 1: Preemption, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985)
L exceeds the future maximum of min(L,F ) for the first time at τ0, whence there will be
preemption. Taking that into account, at most the maximum of min(L,F ) up to τ0 might be
achieved. However, L will also exceed this reduced value, at τ1. In the limit, τ˜(0) = T1 is
the first inevitable preemption point. Fudenberg and Tirole also consider another, Case B, in
which the peak at Tˆ2 is higher than first one. Then τ˜(0) = ∞, because L = F at and from
their global peak onwards, and the player can coordinate on joint late adoption. In general we
may have much more complex stochastic patterns, of course, with arbitrary regions of first-
and second-mover advantages, that may trigger preemption or not.
9 Conclusion
In many timing games mixed strategies play an important role as we have argued, either for
equilibrium existence or to resolve any strategic conflicts (about roles with differing amenities)
within the game. Having analysed the two different kinds of local strategic incentives, we have
been able to prove existence of and to characterize quite explicitly subgame-perfect equilibria
for general symmetric stochastic timing games, providing symmetric equilibrium payoffs. Our
approach is based on the general theory of optimal stopping and demonstrates which kinds of
stopping problems need to be solved to verify equilibria, not only but in particular for mixed
strategies.
There are possibly different equilibria for a given timing game, with varying degrees of
preemption. We have considered the two extreme cases: If one initiates preemption whenever
there is any first-mover advantage, payoffs may be severely restricted. However, we have shown
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how to reduce preemption to a minimum and proved existence of corresponding equilibria with
maximally attainable payoffs. If preemption can indeed be prevented in a certain regime with
first-mover advantage (by sufficiently profitable future continuation equilibria), then there
may also exist further equilibria with continuous mixing, which we have only employed at
second-mover advantages. Nevertheless, any such additional mixing will be inefficient and
induce lower payoffs (which one can also show directly).
A more specific strategic investment model with random first- and second-mover advan-
tages is analysed in Steg and Thijssen (2015), where the strategies corresponding to the ones
derived here have Markovian representations.
A Technical results
Lemma A.1. A measurable process X = (Xt)t∈R+ is of class (D) iff the set {Xτ : τ a stopping
time} is uniformly integrable for any given X∞ ∈ L1(P ).
Proof. We only need to show necessity: Let X be of class (D) and fix arbitrary X∞ ∈
L1(P ) and let T denote the set of all stopping times. Then, for any τ ∈ T and n ∈ N,
|Xτ∧n|1τ<∞ ≤ |Xτ∧n|. Hence the set {|Xτ∧n|1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T , n ∈ N} ∪ {|Xτ | : τ <∞ ∈ T } is
uniformly integrable as well. As we may also include limits in probability of its elements, and
|Xτ |1τ<∞ = limn→∞ |Xτ∧n|1τ<∞ a.s. for any τ ∈ T , we observe that {|Xτ |1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T }
is uniformly integrable.
With X∞ ∈ L1(P ), also {|X∞|1τ=∞ : τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable. Now let ε2 > 0. By
uniform integrability there exists a δ > 0 such that max
{
E[|Xτ |1τ<∞1A], E[|X∞|1τ=∞1A]
} ≤
ε
2 for any measurable A with P (A) < δ and any τ ∈ T . Hence we have E[(|Xτ |1τ<∞ +
|X∞|1τ=∞)1A] ≤ ε, which shows that {|Xτ |1τ<∞ + |X∞|1τ=∞ : τ ∈ T } is uniformly inte-
grable as claimed.
Lemma A.2. If L is a (measurable) process of class (D) then there exists a constant K ∈ R+
such that for any process G that is a.s. right-continuous, non-decreasing, non-negative and
bounded by some G∞ ∈ L∞(P ) and all random variables 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ ∞ a.s. we have
(i) E
[∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt
]
≤ K‖G∞‖∞ <∞ and
(ii)
∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫ ∞
0
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)∈[a,b) dx <∞ a.s.,
where τG(x) := inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt ≥ x}, x ∈ R+, and ∆G0 ≡ G0; equivalently, “Gt > x” in
τG(x).
If {|Lτ |1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T } is bounded in L∞(P ) by K ∈ R+ and G bounded by some G∞ ∈
L1(P ), (i) holds with KE[G∞] instead and (ii) as stated.
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Proof. The (a.s.) non-decreasing family of stopping times
(
τG(x)
)
x∈R+ is the left-continuous
inverse of G, which satisfies
τG(x) ≤ t ⇔ Gt ≥ x.
Thus, with the convention
∫
[0,c] dG = Gc, we have
∫
[0,∞) 1A dG =
∫∞
0 1τG(x)∈A dx for all
A ∈ {[0, c] : c ∈ R+} and hence for A = R+ by monotone convergence, a.s. By a monotone
class argument37 the relation holds on all of B(R+) a.s.
Since L·(ω) : R+ → R, t 7→ Lt(ω), is Borel measurable38 like the function 1t∈[a(ω),b(ω)), we
now obtain the following change-of-variable formula39:∫
[a,b)
|Lt| dGt =
∫
{τG(x)<∞}
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)∈[a,b) dx a.s.
As inf{t ≥ 0 |Gt > x} = τG(x+), which differs from τG(x) only on a set of Lebesgue measure
(dx) 0, we can equivalently use the former. By Fubini’s Theorem
E
[∫ ∞
0
∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)∈[a,b) dx] ≤ ∫ ‖G∞‖∞
0
E
[∣∣LτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)<∞] dx. (A.1)
As L is of class (D), {|Lτ |1τ<∞ : τ ∈ T } is bounded in L1(P ) by some K < ∞, whence the
RHS of (A.1) is bounded by K‖G∞‖∞ if the latter is finite. If supτ∈T ‖Lτ1τ<∞‖∞ ≤ K and
G bounded by G∞ ∈ L1(P ), then the RHS of (A.1) is bounded by∫ ∞
0
E
[
K1τG(x)<∞
]
dx = E
[∫ ∞
0
K1τG(x)<∞ dx
]
≤ KE[G∞] <∞.
In either case it follows that
∫
[a,b) |Lt| dGt <∞ a.s.
Lemma A.3. Suppose the processes L, F , and M are optional and of class (D) and the
adapted process G is right-continuous, non-decreasing and taking values in [0, 1] a.s. Then S
defined by
Su :=
∫
[0,u)
Fs dGs + ∆GuMu +
(
1−Gu
)
Lu, u ∈ R+,
is optional and of class (D) as well.
Proof. The components of S are obviously optional, in particular the integral being a left-
continuous and ∆G the difference of a right-continuous and a left-continuous adapted process.
We have to show that
(
S(τ)
)
τ<∞ a.s. is uniformly integrable and obviously only need to con-
sider the first, integral component of S. By the Theorem of de la Vallée-Poussin it is necessary
37See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 1.1.
38See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.26 (i).
39See, e.g., Kallenberg (2002), Lemma 1.22. One needs to restrict dx to {τG(x) < ∞}, which is redundant
whenever we have [a, b).
28
and sufficient for a process X to be of class (D) that there exists a non-decreasing and convex
function g : R+ → R+ such that limt→∞ g(t)t =∞ and supτ<∞E
[
g
(|Xτ |)] <∞.
Borrowing the corresponding function g that there is for F and by a change of variable as
in Lemma A.2 we obtain
sup
τ<∞
E
[
g
(∣∣∣∣∫[0,τ) Fs dGs
∣∣∣∣)] ≤ sup
τ<∞
E
[
g
(∫ 1
0
∣∣FτG(x)∣∣1τG(x)<τ dx)]
≤ sup
τ<∞
E
[∫ 1
0
g
(∣∣FτG(x)∣∣) dx] = ∫ 1
0
E
[
g
(∣∣FτG(x)∣∣)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤supσ<∞ E[g(|Fσ |)]<∞
dx <∞.
We used Jensen’s inequality for the last estimate.
Lemma A.4. Consider two stopping times σ ≤ τ and an event C ∈ Fσ. Then
ϑ := σ1C + τ1Cc
is a stopping time. If the filtration is complete, it suffices that σ ≤ τ a.s.
Proof. To verify that ϑ is a stopping time, we check whether {ϑ ≤ u} ∈ Fu for all u ∈ R+.
First note that
{ϑ ≤ u} = ({σ ≤ u} ∩ C) ∪ ({τ ≤ u} ∩ Cc).
The first intersection belongs to Fu by definition of Fσ. Then also its complement ({σ ≤
u} ∩ C)c = {σ > u} ∪ Cc ∈ Fu and thus Cc ∩ {σ ≤ u} ∈ Fu. Finally, as {τ ≤ u} ∈ Fu, we
conclude
Cc ∩ {σ ≤ u} ∩ {τ ≤ u} = Cc ∩ {τ ≤ u} ∈ Fu.
If σ ≤ τ only a.s., the last equality holds up to the nullset Cc ∩ {σ > u} ∩ {τ ≤ u}, which is
contained in Fu if the filtration is complete.
Lemma A.5. The process L˜τϑ := 1t<τϑL + 1t≥τϑ max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) defined in Theorem 5.1
is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation on [ϑ,∞], where DL˜ is hence left-
continuous a.s.
Proof. Let (τn) be a sequence of stopping times that is a.s. increasing and taking values in
[ϑ,∞], and denote the limit by τ ∈ T . Define the measurable set
A :=
⋂
n
{τn < τϑ}.
Then limn L˜τn = L˜τ a.s. on Ac, implying limnE[1AcL˜τn ] = E[1AcL˜τ ] since L˜ is of class (D).
We obtain the analogue for L∧F if we use (τn∧ τϑ) and (τ ∧ τϑ), respectively. Combining
the latter fact with upper-semi-continuity from the left in expectation given by Assumption
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2.1 (iii) yields
lim sup
n
E
[
1A(L ∧ F )τn∧τϑ + 1Ac(L ∧ F )τn∧τϑ
] ≤ E[1A(L ∧ F )τ∧τϑ + 1Ac(L ∧ F )τ∧τϑ]
⇒ lim sup
n
E
[
1A(L ∧ F )τn
] ≤ E[1A(L ∧ F )τ ].
Note that (L ∧ F )τn = L˜τn on A and (L ∧ F )τ ≤ L˜τ on A ⊂ {τ ≤ τϑ}, implying the first
claim.
Finally we show that if L˜ is upper-semi-continuous from the left in expectation on an
interval [ϑ,∞], then the paths of DL˜ are left-continuous on that interval, a.s. Define as an
auxiliary process Lˆ := 1t<ϑMˆ+1t≥ϑL˜, where Mˆ is a right-continuous version of the martingale
(E[L˜ϑ|Ft])t≥0, which is uniformly integrable and thus (left-) continuous in expectation thanks
to optional sampling. Lˆ inherits upper-semi-continuity from the left in expectation because
E[Lˆτn ] = E[1τn<ϑL˜ϑ + 1τn≥ϑL˜τn ] = E[L˜τn∨ϑ] and similarly E[Lˆτ ] = E[L˜τ∨ϑ]. Since L˜ and Lˆ
agree on [ϑ,∞], their Snell envelopes UL˜ and ULˆ agree at any stopping time in that interval
and thus UL˜1t≥ϑ and ULˆ1t≥ϑ are indistinguishable by the uniqueness of optional projections.
The same holds for the compensators DL˜ and DLˆ on [ϑ,∞] by uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer-
decomposition. DLˆ is left-continuous a.s. since Lˆ is upper-semi-continuous from the left in
expectation, see footnote 24.
Lemma A.6. Let A,B : R+ → R ∪ {+∞} be two right-continuous, nondecreasing functions,
0 ≤ ∆B ≤ 1. Then the differential equation
dG = (1−G) dA, G0− = a ∈ R (A.2)
has the solution
G = 1− (1− a)e−
∫
dAc∏(1 + ∆A)−1 = 1− (1− a)e− ∫ dAc−∑ ln(1+∆A),
where Ac = A−∑∆A ∈ [A0, A] is the continuous part of A, and the differential equation
dG = (1−G−) dB, G0− = b ∈ R (A.3)
has the solution
G = 1− (1− b)e−
∫
dBc∏(1−∆B) = 1− (1− b)e− ∫ dBc+∑ ln(1−∆B).
Any solution to (A.2) or (A.3) is monotone towards, but never crossing, 1. G solves both
equations iff ∆A = ∆B1−∆B , resp. ∆B =
∆A
1+∆A .
Proof. Straightforward to check. Note that dG0 = (1−a) dA01+∆A0 for any solution to (A.2), implying
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both monotonicity on either side of 1 and that the latter can never be crossed. Indeed,
G0 ≷ 1⇔ ∆G0 ≷ 1−G0− = 1− a⇔ 0 ≷ 1− a.
Similarly dG0 = (1−b) dB0 for any solution to (A.3), implyingG0 ≷ 1⇔ ∆G0 ≷ 1−G0− =
1− b⇔ 0 ≷ 1− b and ∆B0 < 1, where ∆B0 ∈ [0, 1] is used for the last equivalence.
Lemma A.7. Let (Yt, Zt)t∈[0,1] be a family of random variables. Assume that the family (Yt)
is uniformly integrable and that (Zt) is bounded in L∞(P ) and Zt → 0 in probability as t→ 1.
Then
lim
t→1E[YtZt] = 0.
Proof. (‖Zt‖∞) is bounded by a constant K, hence (Zt) is uniformly integrable and converges
to the constant 0 also in L1(P ) as t → 1. Since (Yt) is uniformly integrable, we can find for
any ε > 0 a suitable constant Kε ≥ 0 such that
E
[
1|Yt|≥Kε |YtZt|
] ≤ εK for all t ∈ [0, 1].
In combination,
lim sup
t→1
E
[|YtZt|] = lim sup
t→1
{
E
[
1|Yt|≥Kε |YtZt|
]
+ E
[
1|Yt|<Kε |YtZt|
]}
≤ lim sup
t→1
E
[
1|Yt|≥Kε |YtZt|
]
+ lim
t→1E
[
1|Yt|<Kε |YtZt|
] ≤ εK
and the claim follows.
B Proofs
B.1 Proofs for results in Sections 3–7
Proof of Lemma 3.1. For Gϑi feasible we can define the right-continuous inverse
τG,ϑi (x) := inf
{
s ≥ ϑ ∣∣Gϑi (s) > x}, x ∈ R+.
As in Lemma A.2 it leads to the change-of-variable formula
∫
[ϑ,∞)
Sϑi (s) dGϑi (s) =
∫ 1
0
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (x)
)
1
τG,ϑi (x)<∞
dx a.s.
Further we have x > Gϑi (∞−) ⇒ τG,ϑi (x) = ∞ ⇒ x ≥ Gϑi (∞−), i.e., 1x>Gϑi (∞−) ≤
1
τG,ϑi (x)=∞
≤ 1x≥Gϑi (∞−) for all x ∈ R+ a.s., implying
∆Gϑi (∞)Sϑi (∞) =
(∫ 1
0
1
τG,ϑi (x)=∞
dx
)
Sϑi (∞) a.s.
31
Thus,
V ϑi (Gϑi , Gϑj ) =
∫ 1
0
E
[
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (x)
)
1
τG,ϑi (x)<∞
∣∣∣Fϑ] dx+ ∫ 1
0
E
[
Sϑi (∞)1τG,ϑi (x)=∞
∣∣∣Fϑ] dx
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (x)
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] dx (B.1)
≤
∫ 1
0
ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
Sϑi (τ)
∣∣Fϑ] dx = ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
Sϑi (τ)
∣∣Fϑ].
Proof of Lemma 4.1. By right-continuity of L, we have Sϑi (τ+) − Sϑi (τ) = ∆Gϑj (τ)
(
Fτ −
Mτ
) ≥ 0 for any τ ∈ T . Now consider the set {τi < τL(ϑ)} on which we have, a.s.,
E
[
Sϑi
(
τL(ϑ)+
)− Sϑi (τi) ∣∣∣Fτi]
= E
[∫
[τi,τL(ϑ)]
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s) +
(
1−Gϑj
(
τL(ϑ)
))
LτL(ϑ) −∆Gϑj (τi)Mτi −
(
1−Gϑj
(
τi
))
Lτi
∣∣∣∣Fτi]
≥ E
[
FτL(ϑ)
(
Gϑj
(
τL(ϑ)
)−Gϑj (τi−))+ (1−Gϑj (τL(ϑ)))LτL(ϑ) − (1−Gϑj (τi−))Lτi ∣∣∣∣Fτi]
≥ E
[
LτL(ϑ)
(
1−Gϑj
(
τi−
))− (1−Gϑj (τi−))Lτi ∣∣∣∣Fτi] ≥ 0.
The first inequality is obtained from a change of variable (demonstrated below) similar to that
in the proof of Lemma 3.1, exploiting that F is a supermartingale, and L ≥ M . The second
inequality is due to F ≥ L and the last to the optimality of τL(ϑ). Note that the last one will
be strict if P [τ i < τL(ϑ) and Gϑj
(
τi−
)
< 1] > 0 by suboptimality of any ϑ ≤ τi < τL(ϑ). The
second claimed estimate of the lemma follows from setting τi = ϑ in the steps above. Further,
the previous and following steps go through identically with τL(ϑ) replaced by τL(ϑ).
The change of variable proceeds as follows:
E
[∫
[τi,τL(ϑ)]
Fs dG
ϑ
j (s)
∣∣∣∣Fτi]
= E
[∫ 1
0
F
τG,ϑj (x)
1
τG,ϑj (x)∈[τi,τL(ϑ)]
dx
∣∣∣∣Fτi] = ∫ 10 E
[
F
τG,ϑj (x)
1
τG,ϑj (x)∈[τi,τL(ϑ)]
∣∣∣Fτi] dx
≥
∫ 1
0
E
[
E
[
FτL(ϑ)
∣∣∣F
τG,ϑj (x)
]
1
τG,ϑj (x)∈[τi,τL(ϑ)]
∣∣∣Fτi] dx = ∫ 1
0
E
[
FτL(ϑ)1τG,ϑj (x)∈[τi,τL(ϑ)]
∣∣∣Fτi] dx
= E
[
FτL(ϑ)
∫ 1
0
1
τG,ϑj (x)∈[τi,τL(ϑ)]
dx
∣∣∣∣Fτi] = E[FτL(ϑ)(Gϑj (τL(ϑ))−Gϑj (τi−))∣∣∣Fτi].
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let ϑ ∈ T and C ∈ FτL(ϑ). Then τ∗1 , τ∗2 as hypothesized are
stopping times thanks to Lemma A.4, as τL(ϑ) ≤ τF (ϑ) a.s.
To verify the optimality of τ∗1 , it suffices by Lemmata 3.1 and 4.1 to consider stopping
Sϑi from τL(ϑ). On C, Sϑ1 (t) = Lt∧τF (ϑ) for all t ≥ τL(ϑ), such that stopping immediately at
τL(ϑ) is optimal by its optimality for L. On Cc, Sϑ1 (t) = FτL(ϑ) ≥ MτL(ϑ) for all t > τL(ϑ),
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with equality on {τF (ϑ) = τL(ϑ)} by hypothesis. Hence, τF (ϑ) is optimal on Cc. The same
argument applies to τ∗2 , swapping C and Cc.
We can use τF (ϑ) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Ft = Mt}, since it does not occur before τL(ϑ), a.s.
Indeed, as F is a supermartingale dominating L, it also dominates the Snell envelope UL.
Therefore, at τF (ϑ), F = M (by right-continuity and F ≥ M), implying UL = L by L ≥ M .
Hence, τF (ϑ) ≥ inf{t ≥ ϑ |UL(t) = Lt} = τL(ϑ).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. L˜τϑ is right-continuous a.s. and of class (D), so it has a Snell en-
velope U τϑ
L˜
with an integrable and predictable compensator Dτϑ
L˜
. We write for simplicity L˜
and DL˜. The latter is continuous on [ϑ,∞] a.s. since L˜ there is upper-semi-continuous from
the left in expectation, see Lemma A.5 and footnotes 24, 25.
Now Gϑi is a feasible mixed strategy, as it is clearly adapted and a.s. right-continuous and
non-decreasing, taking values Gϑi = 0 on [0, ϑ) and Gϑi (∞) = 1. The only possible jump
occurs at τG,ϑi (1) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑi (t) = 1}.
Gϑj as defined in (5.2) is even continuous up to τϑ: 1F>L/(F − L) can be understood
as a Radon-Nikodym derivative, such that the integral defines a measure on R+, which is
absolutely continuous with respect to the (finite) measure dDL˜ having no mass points.40
To prove first that Gϑj is a best reply to Gϑi we will show in view of Lemma 3.1 and its
proof that
E
[
Sϑj
(
τϑ
) ∣∣∣Fϑ] ≥ E[Sϑj (τ) ∣∣∣Fϑ]
for all stopping times τ ≥ ϑ, with equality whenever dGϑj > 0 (implying equality in (B.1)).
In fact, we establish the stronger condition
E
[
Sϑj
(
τϑ
)− Sϑj (τ) ∣∣∣Fτ ] ≥ 0 (B.2)
(with equality whenever dGϑj (τ) > 0), where it suffices, however, to consider stopping times
τ ≤ τϑ, since ∆Sϑj (τϑ) = ∆Gϑi (τϑ)
(
Fτϑ −Mτϑ
) ≤ 0 by hypothesis, and Sϑj is constant on
(τG,ϑi (1),∞].
To ease readability in the following demonstration of (B.2), we simply write Gi for Gϑi , Sj
for Sϑj , a for τ and b for τ
G,ϑ
i (1). By the other hypothesis ∆Gi(F −M) ≥ 0 at b < τϑ, now
Sj(τϑ) =
∫
[0,b) F dGi + ∆Gi(b) max(Fb,Mb). Further, our Gi satisfies
dGi(s) =
(
1−Gi(s)
) dDL˜(s)
Fs − Ls
for all s ∈ [a, b) a.s., implying∫
[a,b)
(
Fs − Ls
)
dGi(s) =
∫
[a,b)
(
1−Gi(s)
)
dDL˜(s), (B.3)
40The new measure is also σ-finite as {F > L} = ⋃
n∈N{F − L ≥ 1n}.
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where
∫
LdGi is well defined by Lemma A.2 for L of class (D). We apply integration by parts
to the RHS (adjusting for [a, b) closed on the left, open on the right, and recalling that DL˜ is
continuous) to find∫
[a,b)
(
1−Gi(s)
)
dDL˜(s) =
∫
[a,b)
DL˜(s) dGi(s) (B.4)
+
(
1−Gi(b−)
)
DL˜(b)−
(
1−Gi(a−)
)
DL˜(a).
With the help of Gi(b) = 1, (B.3) and (B.4) we see that
Sj(τϑ)− Sj(a) =
∫
[a,b)
Fs dGi(s) + ∆Gi(b) max(Fb,Mb)−
(
1−Gi(a)
)
La −∆Gi(a)Ma
=
∫
[a,b)
(
Ls +DL˜(s)
)
dGi(s) +
(
1−Gi(b−)
)(
max(Fb,Mb) +DL˜(b)
)
− (1−Gi(a−))(La +DL˜(a))+ ∆Gi(a)(La −Ma).
Now, as the martingale componentML˜ of the Snell envelope is uniformly integrable,
∫
ML˜ dGi
is well defined by Lemma A.2. By the change of variable proposed there we find that
E
[∫
[a,b)
ML˜(s) dGi(s)
∣∣∣∣Fa] = ∫ 10 E
[
ML˜
(
τGi (x)
)
1τGi (x)∈[a,b)
∣∣∣Fa] dx
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
E
[
ML˜(b)
∣∣∣FτGi (x)]1τGi (x)∈[a,b) ∣∣∣Fa] dx = E
[
ML˜(b)
∫ 1
0
1τGi (x)∈[a,b) dx
∣∣∣∣Fa]
= E
[
ML˜(b)
(
Gi(b−)−Gi(a−)
) ∣∣∣Fa] = −E[ML˜(b)(1−Gi(b−)) ∣∣∣Fa]+ML˜(a)(1−Gi(a−)).
Combining the last two results yields
E
[
Sj(τϑ)− Sj(a)
∣∣Fa]
= E
[∫
[a,b)
(
Ls +DL˜(s)−ML˜(s)
)
dGi(s) +
(
1−Gi(b−)
)(
max(Fb,Mb) +DL˜(b)−ML˜(b)
)
− (1−Gi(a−))(La +DL˜(a)−ML˜(a))+ ∆Gi(a)(La −Ma) ∣∣∣∣Fa]. (B.5)
It remains to observe that L + DL˜ −ML˜ = L˜ − UL˜ = 0 whenever dDL˜ > 0, i.e., when
dGi > 0 on [a, b), which makes the integral vanish; cf. (3.6). The same argument applies to
the second term where ∆Gi(b) > 0: if b < τϑ, then the jump must result from dDL˜(b) > 0
and Fb = Lb = L˜b = UL˜(b) (≥ Mb by hypothesis); if b = τϑ, then max(Fb,Mb) = L˜b = UL˜(b)
as L˜ is constant on [τϑ,∞]. As ∆Gi(a) = 0 on {a < b}, we are here left with
E
[
Sj(τϑ)− Sj(a)
∣∣Fa] = (1−Gi(a−))(UL˜(a)− La) ≥ 0, (B.6)
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with equality whenever dGi(a) > 0. On {a = b}, we collect terms to
E
[
Sj(τϑ)− Sj(a)
∣∣Fa] = ∆Gi(b)(UL˜(b)−Mb) ≥ 0 (B.7)
due to UL˜(b) = max(Fb,Mb) ≥Mb a.s., as we have argued before. On {b < τϑ}, dGϑj puts no
mass on [b]. On {b = τϑ}, (B.7) is binding iff ∆Gϑi (M − F ) ≥ 0 a.s. at τϑ <∞ (for necessity
of this condition for equilibrium note that ∆Gϑi (τϑ) > 0 ⇒ ∆Gϑj (τϑ) > 0). This establishes
(B.2).
In the case that ∆Gϑi (M − F ) = 0 a.s. at inf{t ∈ R+ |Gϑi (t) = 1} < ∞, the identical
arguments show that Gϑj = Gϑi is a best reply to itself, because then Sϑj is constant on
[τG,ϑi (1),∞] (i.e., Sj(τϑ) = Sj(b) in (B.7)).
There are some slight variations to the above in proving that Gϑi is a best reply to Gϑj 6= Gϑi
without the previous additional condition. The analogue to (B.2) that we seek is
E
[
Sϑi
(
τG,ϑi (1)
)− Sϑi (τ) ∣∣∣Fτ ] ≥ 0 (B.8)
for all stopping times τ ∈ [ϑ, τG,ϑi (1)), with equality whenever dGϑi > 0. Afterwards we will
show that at τG,ϑi (1) it is optimal to stop immediately.
To derive (B.8) we can apply similar arguments as above. The main difference is that
switching to Si = Sϑi and Gj = Gϑj while keeping b = τ
G,ϑ
i (1), we may have Gj(b) < 1.
Nevertheless, ∆Gj(b)Mb = ∆Gj(b) max(Fb,Mb) (in particular ∆Gj(b) = 0 on {b < τϑ} ∪
{∆Gi(b) = 0}), so that on the one hand Si(b) = Sj(τϑ). Indeed, Gi = Gj on [0, b), so
Si(b)−Sj(τϑ) =
(
1−Gj(b)
)
Lb+
(
∆Gj(b)−∆Gi(b)
)
max(Fb,Mb) = 0 on {b < τϑ}∩{∆Gi(b) >
0} – the only set where they might differ – but there Lb = Fb (≥ Mb by hypothesis) and
Gj(b−) = Gi(b−). This implies payoff symmetry once we have (B.8). On the other hand we
get analogously to above (with possibly Gj(b) < 1)
E
[
Si(b)− Si(a)
∣∣Fa] = E[∫
[a,b)
(
Ls +DL˜(s)−ML˜(s)
)
dGj(s) + ∆Gj(b)
(
max(Fb,Mb)− Lb
)
+
(
1−Gj(b−)
)(
Lb +DL˜(b)−ML˜(b)
)
(B.9)
− (1−Gj(a−))(La +DL˜(a)−ML˜(a))+ ∆Gj(a)(La −Ma) ∣∣∣∣Fa].
The integral vanishes as before. Since b is still the same, on {b < τϑ} again Fb = Lb = UL˜(b) ≥
Mb; on {b = τϑ} again max(Fb,Mb) = UL˜(b) and ∆Gj(b) =
(
1 − Gj(b−)
)
. This eliminates
the second and third terms. For any a < b, ∆Gj(a) = 0, hence
E
[
Si(b)− Si(a)
∣∣Fa] = (1−Gj(a−))(UL˜(a)− La) ≥ 0, (B.10)
with equality whenever dGi(a) = dGj(a) > 0. This proves (B.8).
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Let now a = τG,ϑi (1) and b = τ any stopping time taking values in (τ
G,ϑ
i (1),∞]. It remains
to show that E[Si(b)−Si(a)|Fa] ≤ 0 a.s. If a = τG,ϑj (1), then Si(b)−Si(a) = ∆Gj(a)(Fa−Ma)
and ∆Gj(a) > 0 at a = τG,ϑi (1) = τ
G,ϑ
j (1) only if a = τϑ, whence Si(b)−Si(a) = ∆Gi(a)(Fa−
Ma) ≤ 0 by hypothesis. If a < τG,ϑj (1), we have 0 ≤ (F − L)dGj = (1 − Gj)1F>LdDL˜ ≤
(1−Gj)dDL˜ on [a, b). Together with ∆Gj(b)Mb ≤ ∆Gj(b) max(Fb,Mb) we get “≤” in (B.9).
On {b < τϑ} we now have Lb = L˜b ≤ UL˜(b) and ∆Gj(b) = 0, so that “≤” also replaces the
equality in (B.10). As now a = τG,ϑi (1) < τ
G,ϑ
j (1), dDL˜(a) > 0 and UL˜(a) = La. This finishes
our proof.
Remark B.1. Theorem 5.1 remains true if L is only upper-semi-continuous from the right
(and the left), but L ≡M . Then DL˜ will be left-continuous (see footnote 24) and there exists
a feasible strategy Gϑi given by
Gϑi (t) := 1− exp
{
−
∫ u
ϑ
dDc
L˜
(s)
Fs − Ls −
∑
[ϑ,u]
ln
(∆DL˜(s)
Fs − Ls + 1
)}
for t ∈ [ϑ, τϑ), where Dc
L˜
is the continuous part of DL˜ and ∆DL˜(s) = DL˜(s+) −DL˜(s), and
which satisfies
dGϑi (s) =
(
1−Gϑi (s)
) dDL˜(s+)
Fs − Ls .
Then the only modifications in the proof are that we put dDL˜( · +) on the RHS of (B.3), resp.
the LHS (only!) of (B.4). We do not have right-continuity of UL˜− L˜, but
∫
[a,b)(UL˜− L˜) dGi =
0 still holds in (B.5): The argument of footnote 28 applies to ∆DL˜, which has the same
support as ∆Gi. The continuous part dGci is absolutely continuous with respect to dDL˜,
for which we can apply a change of variable similar to Lemma A.2, but with τDL˜(x) :=
inf{t ≥ 0 |DL˜(t) > x},41 such that UL˜ = L˜ a.s. at τDL˜(x), x ∈ R+, cf. (3.4). Hence,
E
[∫
[0,∞) 1UL˜>L˜ dDL˜
]
=
∫∞
0 E
[
1
UL˜(τ
D
L˜ (x))>L˜(τDL˜ (x))
]
dx = 0. Finally we employ L = M to
arrive at (B.6) if ∆G(a) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. We only need to establish time consistency. If the hypothesis holds,
{(ϑ∨ ϑ′) ≤ (τϑ ∧ τϑ′)} differs from{(ϑ∨ ϑ′) ≤ τϑ = τϑ′} := A ∈ F(ϑ∨ϑ′) at most by a nullset.
Only this event is relevant for time consistency, since (ϑ ∨ ϑ′) > (τϑ ∧ τϑ′) a.s. on Ac and
there is no restriction where Gϑi ∨Gϑ
′
i = 1. With L˜τ
ϑ = L˜τϑ
′
a.s. on A, also
ess sup
τ≤τ ′∈T
E
[
L˜τ
ϑ(τ ′)
∣∣Fτ ] = ess sup
τ≤τ ′∈T
E
[
L˜τ
ϑ′ (τ ′)
∣∣Fτ ] a.s.
on {τ ≥ (ϑ ∨ ϑ′)} ∩ A for any τ ∈ T , implying U τϑ
L˜
1t≥(ϑ∨ϑ′) = U τ
ϑ′
L˜
1t≥(ϑ∨ϑ′) a.s. on A
(i.e., the latter two processes are indistinguishable) by the uniqueness of optional projec-
41For (left-) continuous DL˜, τDL˜(x) < t⇔ DL˜(t) > x.
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tions. Correspondingly, Dτϑ
L˜
= Dτϑ
′
L˜
on [ϑ ∨ ϑ′,∞] a.s. by the uniqueness of the Doob-Meyer
decomposition.
The time consistency condition in the equivalent form
(
1 − Gϑi (t)
)
=
(
1 − Gϑi (ϑ′−)
)(
1 −
Gϑ
′
i (t)
)
reads for the given Gϑi
1t<τϑ exp
(
−
t
∫
ϑ
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
/(F − L)
)
= 1ϑ′≤τϑ exp
(
−
ϑ′
∫
ϑ
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
/(F − L)
)
1t<τϑ′ exp
(
−
t
∫
ϑ′
dDτ
ϑ′
L˜
/(F − L)
)
,
which on A and for t ≥ (ϑ ∨ ϑ′) reduces to the true statement
1t<τϑ exp
(
−
t
∫
ϑ
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
/(F − L)
)
= 1t<τϑ exp
(
−
ϑ′
∫
ϑ
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
/(F − L)
)
exp
(
−
t
∫
ϑ′
dDτ
ϑ
L˜
/(F − L)
)
thanks to what we have shown before. The argument for j is analogous.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Consider the subgame starting at a given ϑ ∈ T and let (Gϑ1 , αϑ1)
and
(
Gϑ2 , α
ϑ
2
)
be a pair as hypothesized. First note that τϑ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) +αϑ2 (t) > 0} =
τˆϑ (cf. Definition C.1), such that Gϑ1 = Gϑ2 = 1 a.s. on [τˆϑ,∞]. All other feasibility conditions
for the extended mixed strategies follow from those of Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 7.1.
Now let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j arbitrary in the following (not necessarily the roles assigned in
the theorem) and consider player i deviating to some admissible
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a
)
. Gϑj is continuous
up to τj := τG,ϑj (1) = inf{t ≥ 0 |Gϑj (t) ≥ 1}, whence only Gϑa matters on [ϑ, τj) (cf. Definition
C.1):
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= V ϑi
(
Gϑa ,1t≥τjαϑa , Gϑj , αϑj
)
.
So let αϑa = 0 on [ϑ, τj) wlog. regarding optimality. Then τj ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑa(t) + αϑj (t) > 0},
implying
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[ ∫
[0,τj)
(
1−Gϑj
)
LdGϑa +
∫
[0,τj)
(
1−Gϑa
)
F dGϑj +
∑
[0,τj)
M∆Gϑa∆Gϑj
+
(
1−Gϑa(τj−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τj−)
)
V
τj
i
(
G
τj
a , α
ϑ
a , G
τj
j , α
ϑ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ] (B.11)
by iterated expectations, with Gτja and Gτjj determined by time consistency (in particular, G
τj
a
arbitrary where Gϑa(τj−) = 1). Where Gϑj jumps to 1 before τϑ, by construction Fτj ≥ Mτj ,
so waiting is a best reply, e.g. playing Gτja := 1t≥τϑGϑa and α
τj
a := 1t≥τϑαϑa . Therefore
V
τj
i
(
G
τj
a , α
ϑ
a , G
τj
j , α
ϑ
j
) ≤ V τji (1t≥τϑGϑa ,1t≥τϑαϑa , Gτjj , αϑj ). (B.12)
Pasting Gϑa and G
τj
a by time consistency yields 1t<τjGϑa + 1τj≤t<τϑG
ϑ
a(τj−) + 1t≥τϑGϑa , which
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in conjuction with 1t≥τϑαϑa is (weakly) better than
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a
)
– by combining (B.12) and (B.11).
We may thus even assume αϑa = 0 on [ϑ, τϑ) wlog. regarding optimality.
On {τϑ < τˆϑ}, Mτϑ ≥ Fτϑ by right-continuity, whence
(
Gτ
ϑ
i , α
τϑ
i
)
=
(
1t≥τϑ , αϑi
)
and(
Gτ
ϑ
j , α
τϑ
j
)
=
(
1t≥τϑ , αϑj
)
are mutual best replies with payoffs V τϑi
(
Gτ
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= Mτϑ =
max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ). Proposition 7.1 shows that
(
Gτ
ϑ
i , α
τϑ
i
)
=
(
1t≥τϑ , αϑi
)
and
(
Gτ
ϑ
j , α
τϑ
j
)
=(
1t≥τϑ , αϑj
)
are mutual best replies on {τϑ = τˆϑ} with payoffs V τϑi
(
Gτ
ϑ
i , α
ϑ
i , G
τϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
=
max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ). For {ϑ = τϑ} this directly implies optimality, while for {ϑ < τϑ} we ob-
tain the estimate
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , α
ϑ
a , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ≤ V ϑi (1t<τϑGϑa + 1t≥τϑ ,1t≥τϑαϑi , Gϑj , αϑj )
by extending (B.11) to τϑ with τϑ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑa(t) + αϑj (t) > 0} thanks to the previous
steps.
In summary, this means that for player i it suffices to verify optimality of Gϑi against Gϑj
as (standard) feasible mixed strategies if we use the payoffs
V ϑi
(
Gϑa , G
ϑ
j
)
= E
[ ∫
[0,τϑ)
(
1−Gϑj
)
LdGϑa +
∫
[0,τϑ)
(
1−Gϑa
)
F dGϑj +
∑
[0,τϑ)
M∆Gϑa∆Gϑj
+
(
1−Gϑa(τϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τϑ−)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1−Gϑa(τϑ)+∆Gϑa(τϑ))∆Gϑj (τϑ)
max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ)
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[ ∫
[0,∞]
Sϑi dG
ϑ
a
∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
for any feasible Gϑa , where we set Sϑi ≡
∫
[0,τϑ) F dG
ϑ
j +
(
1 − Gϑj (τϑ−)
)
max(Fτϑ ,Mτϑ) on
[τϑ,∞], on which in particular Gϑj ≡ 1; analogously for player j. This is however equivalent
to the setting of Theorem 5.1 with ∆Gϑi (F −M) = 0 a.s. at τϑ (note that ∆Gϑi (F −M) ≥ 0 at
τG,ϑi (1) = inf{t ∈ R+ |Gϑi (t) = 1} since τϑ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Mt > Ft}), which proves optimality.
Time consistency of G1 and G2 is obtained exactly as in Theorem 5.3, and holds trivially
for α1 and α2 because αϑi in Proposition 7.1 does not depend on ϑ (except for the feasibility
condition αϑi =0 on [0, ϑ), of course).
Finally, if either Fτ = Mτ or τ = inf{t > τ |Lt > Ft} when Lτ = Fτ , then the above
is equivalent to the setting of Theorem 5.1 with the condition ∆Gϑi (F − M) = 0 a.s. at
τG,ϑi (1) < τϑ.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 8.1
We begin with Lemmata B.2 to B.4, which establish some important necessary conditions
for strategies and payoffs in payoff-symmetric equilibria. They are crucial for the subsequent
proof of Proposition 8.1.
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Lemma B.2. In any payoff-symmetric equilibrium, for any ϑ ∈ T ,∫
[0,t)
1L6=F
(
1−Gϑ2−
)
dGϑ1 =
∫
[0,t)
1L6=F
(
1−Gϑ1−
)
dGϑ2
for all t ∈ R+ a.s. (with Gϑi− the left limit Gϑi −∆Gϑi ) and hence
1L6=F
dGϑ1(
1−Gϑ1−
) = 1L6=F dGϑ2(1−Gϑ2−) , (B.13)
which is to be interpreted as “ = 0” if (1−Gϑ1−)(1−Gϑ2−) = 0. Both representations also hold
with the right limits (1−Gϑ1 ), (1−Gϑ2 ).
Proof. First consider any τ ∈ T with ϑ ≤ τ ≤ τˆϑ = inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t) + αϑ2 (t) > 0} a.s. Time
consistency and iterated expectations imply for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑj
)
LdGϑi +
∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑi
)
F dGϑj +
∑
[0,τ)
M∆Gϑi ∆Gϑj
+
(
1−Gϑi (τ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τ−)
)
V τi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
τ
j , α
τ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ]
= E
[∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑj−
)
LdGϑi +
∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑi−
)
F dGϑj (B.14)
+
∑
[0,τ)
(M − L− F )∆Gϑi ∆Gϑj
+
(
1−Gϑi (τ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τ−)
)
V τi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
τ
j , α
τ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ].
In a payoff-symmetric equilibrium V ϑ1 − V ϑ2 = V τ1 − V τ2 = 0, hence
E
[∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑ2−
)
(L− F ) dGϑ1 −
∫
[0,τ)
(
1−Gϑ1−
)
(L− F ) dGϑ2
∣∣∣∣Fϑ] = 0
for any τ ∈ [ϑ, τˆϑ]. The integrals represent two signed optional random measures,42 which
agree on all optional sets in [0, τˆϑ) (trivially on [0, ϑ) by Gϑi (ϑ−) = 0; the optional σ-field is
generated by the stochastic intervals [0, τ), τ ∈ T ). L and F are optional processes, hence we
may cancel (L−F ) 6= 0 to observe two left-continuous (thus optional) processes ∫[0,t) 1L6=F (1−
Gϑ2−
)
dGϑ1 and
∫
[0,t) 1L6=F
(
1−Gϑ1−
)
dGϑ2 that agree in expectation at any stopping time τ ≤ τˆϑ.
They are thus indistinguishable up to τˆϑ by the uniqueness of optional projections.
The two measures
∫
[0,t) 1L6=F
(
1 − Gϑj−
)
dGϑi do not charge (τˆϑ,∞), where Gϑ1 ∨ Gϑ2 ≡ 1.
For the remaining set [τˆϑ], suppose τˆϑ = τˆϑj (cf. Definition C.1), so Gϑj (τˆϑ) = Gτˆ
ϑ
j (τˆϑ) = 1 by
42∫
[0,t](1 − Gϑ2−)(L − F ) dGϑ1 and
∫
[0,t](1 − Gϑ1−)(L − F ) dGϑ2 are adapted, right-continuous and of finite
variation. Their minimal decomposition is using (L− F )+ and (L− F )−, respectively.
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time consistency. Now, if Gτˆϑi (τˆϑ) = 0, V τˆ
ϑ
i = Fτˆϑ and V τˆ
ϑ
j = Lτˆϑ , implying Lτˆϑ = Fτˆϑ .
If Gτˆϑi (τˆϑ) ∈ (0, 1), then, by Riedel and Steg (2014), Section 3, i is indifferent between
stopping and waiting, i.e., V τˆϑi = Fτˆϑ = αϑj (τˆϑ)Mτˆϑ + (1 − αϑj (τˆϑ))Lτˆϑ . On the other hand,
V τˆ
ϑ
j = Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆϑ)
[
αϑj (τˆϑ)Mτˆϑ +(1−αϑj (τˆϑ))Fτˆϑ
]
+
(
1−Gτˆϑi (τˆϑ)
)
Lτˆϑ . IfMτˆϑ > Fτˆϑ , j would set
αϑj (τˆϑ) = 1, contradicting the indifference of i. IfMτˆϑ < Fτˆϑ , αϑj (τˆϑ) = 0 and hence Lτˆϑ = Fτˆϑ
by the indifference of i. Finally, if Mτˆϑ = Fτˆϑ , V τˆ
ϑ
i = Fτˆϑ = V τˆ
ϑ
j = Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆϑ)Fτˆϑ +
(
1 −
Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆϑ)
)
Lτˆϑ , and hence again Lτˆϑ = Fτˆϑ . In summary, we must have Gτˆ
ϑ
i (τˆϑ) = 1 if Lτˆϑ 6=
Fτˆϑ and then by time consistency ∆Gϑi (τˆϑ) = 1 − Gϑi (τˆϑ−) and ∆Gϑj (τˆϑ) = 1 − Gϑj (τˆϑ−),
which makes our measures above agree on all of [0,∞).
The representation (B.13) is obtained by integrating
[
(1 − Gϑ1−)(1 − Gϑ2−)
]−1 on {Gϑ1− ∨
Gϑ2− < 1} w.r.t. each measure. Finally, 1L6=F
(
1 − Gϑ2
)
dGϑ1 = 1L 6=F
(
1 − Gϑ1
)
dGϑ2 is obtained
analogously, skipping the step (B.14).
Lemma B.3. Gϑ1 = Gϑ2 on
[
ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |1L=F (dGϑ1 + dGϑ2 ) > 0}
)
a.s.
Proof. It is easier to work with 1L6=F
(
1−Gϑj
)
dGϑi = 1L6=F
(
1−Gϑi
)
dGϑj , i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
On the interval
[
ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |1L=F (dGϑ1 + dGϑ2 ) > 0}
)
we can ignore 1L6=F , whence we now
get Gϑi (ϑ) = Gϑj (ϑ) and, while Gϑj < 1, dGϑi = φdGϑj with
φ = 1−G
ϑ
i
1−Gϑj
, φ0 = 1. (B.15)
By rearranging (B.15), for all t ∈ [ϑ, inf{t ≥ ϑ |1L=F (dGϑ1 + dGϑ2 ) > 0}) ∩ {Gϑj (t) < 1},
Gϑi (t) = 1−
(
1−Gϑj (t)
)
φt = Gϑi (0) +
∫
(0,t]
φdGϑj
⇔ φt − 1 = Gϑj (t)φt −Gϑj (0)−
∫
(0,t]
φdGϑj
⇔ φt − φ0 =
∫
(0,t]
Gϑj− dφ.
The last line is obtained by integration by parts, as φ is right-continuous while Gϑj < 1. It
implies that φ must indeed be constant where Gϑj < 1. If Gϑj jumps to 1 where L 6= F then(
1−Gϑi
)
∆Gϑj =
(
1−Gϑj
)
∆Gϑi = 0, i.e., Gϑi must attain 1, too, which completes the proof.
Lemma B.4. Suppose ∆Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∨∆Gϑ2 (ϑ) > 0 in a payoff-symmetric equilibrium. Then
Fϑ ≤ max(Lϑ,Mϑ) and V ϑ1 = V ϑ2 ≤ ∆Gϑj (ϑ) max(Fϑ,Mϑ) +
(
1−∆Gϑj (ϑ)
)
Lϑ
for j = 1, 2, a.s.
Proof. To simplify notation, note that ∆Gϑi (ϑ) = Gϑi (ϑ), i = 1, 2. First consider ϑ < τˆϑ. If
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Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∧ Gϑ2 (ϑ) > 0, either player i is willing to stop, so V ϑi = Gϑj (ϑ)Mϑ +
(
1 − Gϑj (ϑ)
)
Lϑ ≥
Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ +
(
1−Gϑj (ϑ)
)
Lϑ and hence Mϑ ≥ Fϑ, a.s., proving the claim.43
If Gϑ1 (ϑ) ∧Gϑ2 (ϑ) = 0, then Lemma B.2 (resp. equation (B.13)) implies Lϑ = Fϑ a.s. The
player i with Gϑi (ϑ) > 0 is willing to stop, so V ϑi = Lϑ = Gϑi (ϑ)Fϑ +
(
1−Gϑi (ϑ)
)
Lϑ = V ϑj ≥
Gϑi (ϑ)Mϑ +
(
1 − Gϑi (ϑ)
)
Lϑ. The second equality just applies Lϑ = Fϑ and the estimate is
player j’s opportunity to stop (it now shows also Fϑ ≥Mϑ, a.s.).
With extended mixed strategies, suppose now ϑ = τˆϑj (cf. Definition C.1), so Gϑj (ϑ) = 1.
Then, by Riedel and Steg (2014), Section 3, V ϑi = max{Fϑ, αϑj (ϑ)Mϑ + (1 − αϑj (ϑ))Lϑ}. On
{Fϑ > max(Mϑ, Lϑ)}, player i would ensure to become follower to realize V ϑi = Fϑ, whence j
would become leader for sure with V ϑj = Lϑ < Fϑ, contradicting payoff symmetry.
Now suppose V ϑi > max(Fϑ,Mϑ). Then we would have V ϑi = αϑj (ϑ)Mϑ+ (1−αϑj (ϑ))Lϑ >
Fϑ, and i would ensure not to become follower. Then j would for sure not become leader
and V ϑj ≤ max(Fϑ,Mϑ), contradicting payoff symmetry. This proves the claim for i. If also
ϑ = τˆϑi and hence Gϑi (ϑ) = 1, reversing roles shows that V ϑj ≤ max(Fϑ,Mϑ). If ϑ = τˆϑj < τˆϑi ,
V ϑj = Gϑi (ϑ)
[
αϑj (ϑ)Mϑ+(1−αϑj (ϑ))Fϑ
]
+(1−Gϑi (ϑ))Lϑ ≤ Gϑi (ϑ) max(Fϑ,Mϑ)+(1−Gϑi (ϑ))Lϑ,
finishing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Fix ϑ ∈ T . By optimality we must have for any τ ≥ ϑ with
Gϑi (τ−) < 1 a.s. that
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= V ϑi
(
Gτi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
in any equilibrium. By time consistency and iterated expectations,
V ϑi
(
Gτi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
)
= E
[∫
[0,τ)
F dGϑj +
(
1−Gϑj (τ−)
)
V τi
(
Gτi , α
τ
i , G
τ
j , α
τ
j
) ∣∣∣∣Fϑ]. (B.16)
Now define the stopping times
τˆ(x) := inf{t ≥ ϑ |1F≥L
(
dGϑi + dGϑj
)
> 0} ∧ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑi ∨Gϑj > x}
for x ∈ [0, 1), and their monotone limit τˆ(1) := limx↗1 τˆ(x). Then (B.16) holds for all τˆ(x),
0 ≤ x < 1, with F dGϑj = (L ∧ F ) dGϑj . The integral converges as x → 1, also in expectation
because F is of class (D).
First consider the set
{
Gϑi (τˆ(1)−) ∨ Gϑj (τˆ(1)−) < 1
}
, where V τˆ(x)i → V τˆ(1)i a.s. Further,
if Gϑi ∨Gϑj < 1 at τˆ(1), then 1F≥L
(
dGϑi + dGϑj
)
> 0, hence Fτˆ(1) ≥ Lτˆ(1) and τˆ(1) is a point
of increase for either Gϑi or Gϑj , so at least one player is willing to stop. If there is no jump,
then V τˆ(1)i = V
τˆ(1)
j = Lτˆ(1). If there is any jump, then Fτˆ(1) = Lτˆ(1) and V
τˆ(1)
i ≤ Fτˆ(1) by
43Suppose that Gϑi (τ∗) > 0 in an equilibrium, τˆϑ > τ∗ ∈ T , so E
[
Sϑi (τ∗)
∣∣Fϑ] = ess supϑ≤τ∈T E[Sϑi (τ) ∣∣
Fϑ
]
≥ limε↘0E
[
Sϑi (τ∗ + ε)
∣∣ Fϑ]. As L is right-continuous by assumption, we have Sϑi (t+) − Sϑi (t) =
(Ft −Mt)∆Gϑj (t). Since Sϑi is of class (D), limε↘0E
[
Sϑi (τ∗ + ε)
∣∣Fϑ] = E[Sϑi (τ∗+) ∣∣Fϑ], hence (Fτ∗ −
Mτ∗)∆Gϑj (τ∗) ≤ 0 a.s.
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Lemma B.4 and the hypothesis M ≤ F . On the other hand, if Gϑi ∨ Gϑj = 1 at τˆ(1), then
G
τˆ(1)
i (τˆ(1))∨Gτˆ(1)j (τˆ(1)) = 1, hence V τˆ(1)i ≤ Fτˆ(1) ≤ Lτˆ(1) by Lemma B.4 andM ≤ min(F,L).
Now consider the set
{
Gϑi (τˆ(1)−) ∨ Gϑj (τˆ(1)−) = 1
}
, which means that one distribution
has fully grown on {F < L}. Then in fact Gϑi (τˆ(1)−) = Gϑj (τˆ(1)−) = 1 by Lemma B.3. Thus,(
1−Gϑj (τˆ(x)−)
)
V
τˆ(x)
i → 0 a.s. because
(
V
τˆ(x)
i
)
x∈[0,1) is uniformly integrable (see Lemma A.7).
In total, we have that
(
1 − Gϑj (τˆ(x)−)
)
V
τˆ(x)
i in (B.16) converges a.s. and in expectation
to a limit bounded by
(
1−Gϑj (τˆ(1)−)
)(
Lτˆ(1) ∧ Fτˆ(1)
)
, which completes the proof. Note that
we can also state the result in the form
V ϑi
(
Gϑi , α
ϑ
i , G
ϑ
j , α
ϑ
j
) ≤ ∆Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ + (1−∆Gϑj (ϑ))UL∧F (ϑ) ≤ UL∧F (ϑ).
B.3 Proof of Theorem 8.2
Proposition 8.1 shows that in a payoff-symmetric equilibrium, the continuation values are at
most
∆Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ +
(
1−∆Gϑj (ϑ)
)
ess sup
ϑ≤τ∈T
E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fϑ] ≤ UL∧F (ϑ),
in fact considering only stopping times τ ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |Gϑi ∨ Gϑj = 1}. However, if L >
UL∧F and Gϑj < 1, player i’s value V ϑi would be at least ∆Gϑj (ϑ)Fϑ +
(
1 − ∆Gϑj (ϑ)
)
Lϑ
by considering the limit of stopping at ϑ + ε with ε ↘ 0 (for convergence, cf. footnote
43); a contradiction. Therefore the game beginning at ϑ cannot continue past τ0(ϑ), and
the continuation values are actually bounded by U(L∧F )τ0(ϑ) ≤ UL∧F . This argument of
course iterates, inducing decreasing sequences of stopping times
(
τn(ϑ)
)
n
and Snell envelopes(
U(L∧F )τn(ϑ)
)
n
, as one introduces increasingly strict constraints. The decreasing sequence of
stopping times is bounded below by ϑ, so the limit τ˜(ϑ) = limn→∞ τn(ϑ) exists and is a
stopping time as well.
It is convenient to have optimal stopping times that attain U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) , respectively. They
exist because each process (L ∧ F )τn(ϑ) is clearly right-continuous and of class (D), but also
upper-semi-continuous in expectation under Assumption 2.1 (iii).
These optimal stopping times simplify the argument to prove τ˜(ϑ) ≤ inf{t ≥ ϑ |L >
U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)}. Suppose to the contrary that there is a stopping time σ ∈ [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)] with Lσ >
U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(σ) with positive probability, i.e., Lσ > E
[
Lτ ∧ Fτ
∣∣Fσ] for all τ ∈ [σ, τ˜(ϑ)]. Since
Lσ ≤ U(L∧F )τn(ϑ)(σ) a.s. for each n ∈ N, there must exist stopping times σn ∈ [τ˜(ϑ), τn(ϑ)]
such that Lσ ≤ E
[
Lσn ∧ Fσn
∣∣Fσ]. Necessarily σn → τ˜(ϑ) a.s., and by right-continuity and
L being of class (D), Lσ ≤ E
[
Lτ˜(ϑ) ∧ Fτ˜(ϑ)
∣∣Fσ] ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(σ). Thus there is no threat of
preemption on [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) if U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) is the continuation value.
τ˜(ϑ) is indeed maximal by construction. Whenever we have another τˆ ≥ ϑ such that
L ≤ U(L∧F )τˆ on [ϑ, τˆ), then τˆ ≤ τ0(ϑ) a.s., because U(L∧F )τˆ ≤ UL∧F . So U(L∧F )τˆ ≤ U(L∧F )τ0(ϑ)
and by iteration τˆ ≤ τn(ϑ), n ∈ N.
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Let us remark some further regularity properties. Since U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) ≥ (L∧F )τn(ϑ), we can
only have L > U(L∧F )τn(ϑ) if L > F , thus L ≥ F by right-continuity at all τk(ϑ), k ∈ N0, and
at τ˜(ϑ), too. Moreover,
τ˜(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ τ˜(ϑ) |Lt > Ft} a.s. (B.17)
because we would otherwise have L = L ∧ F ≤ U(L∧F )τk(ϑ) for all k ∈ N0 until the stopping
time on the right. By construction we have τ˜(ϑ′) = τ˜(ϑ) a.s. on {ϑ′ ∈ [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)]} for any
ϑ′ ∈ T , hence τ˜(ϑ) is monotone in ϑ and
τ˜(ϑ) = lim
n→∞ τ˜(ϑn) a.s. (B.18)
for any sequence ϑn ↘ ϑ, (ϑn)n ⊂ T . Indeed, (B.18) also holds on {ϑ = τ˜(ϑ)}: If we denote
the limit by τ˜ ′ ≥ τ˜(ϑ), then τ˜(ϑn) = τ˜ ′ on {ϑn ≤ τ˜ ′}, and therefore, using that U(L∧F )τ˜ ′ is a
supermartingale,
U(L∧F )τ˜ ′ (ϑ) ≥ E
[
U(L∧F )τ˜ ′ (ϑn)
∣∣Fϑ]
≥ E[Lϑn1ϑn<τ˜ ′ + Fτ˜ ′1ϑn≥τ˜ ′ ∣∣Fϑ]
for any n ∈ N. The term on the second line goes to Lϑ on {ϑ < τ˜ ′} as n → ∞, thanks to L
being right-continuous and of class (D). This argument implies L ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜ ′ on [ϑ, τ˜ ′). By
the maximality of τ˜(ϑ) shown before, τ˜(ϑ) = τ˜ ′ a.s.
Now define the process L˜ by
L˜t :=
Lt t < τ˜(ϑ)Fτ˜(ϑ) t ≥ τ˜(ϑ)
with Snell envelope UL˜ and its compensator DL˜. From Lτ˜(ϑ) ≥ Fτ˜(ϑ) we see that (L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) ≤
L˜ ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) ≤ UL˜ on [ϑ,∞]. Since the Snell envelope is the smallest supermartingale
dominating the payoff process, the last inequality must actually bind and thus also DL˜ =
D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) on [ϑ,∞]. By this observation we obtain∫
[ϑ,∞]
1L>F dDL˜ =
∑
[ϑ,∞]
∆DL˜ = 0 a.s., (B.19)
which we need to apply Theorem 5.1 for ϑ and τϑ = τ˜(ϑ). Indeed, the path regularity of
(L ∧ F )τ˜(ϑ) verified before implies continuity of D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) and hence that L ≤ U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) =
L∧F , i.e., F ≥ L at any point of increase of dD(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ) on [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)). Furthermore, D(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)
is right-continuous and flat from τ˜(ϑ) on, so it does not charge [τ˜(ϑ),∞], a.s.
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With (B.19) and (B.17) we can now define supporting equilibrium strategies
(
G˜σ1 , α˜
σ
1
)
σ∈T
and
(
G˜σ2 , α˜
σ
2
)
σ∈T as follows. First, if we concentrate on a fixed ϑ, it is enough to set, for any
σ ∈ T ,
α˜σi :=
(
1− 1[ϑ,τ˜(ϑ))
)
ασi
with ασi as in Proposition 7.1, i = 1, 2. Now pick i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and define G˜σi := Gσi ,
G˜σj := Gσj as in Theorem 5.1 with τσ := inf{t ≥ σ |
(
1−1[ϑ,τ˜(ϑ))
)
(Lt−Ft) > 0} (= τ˜(ϑ) a.s. on
{σ ∈ [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)]} by (B.17)). These strategies form a subgame-perfect equilibrium analogously
to Theorem 7.3 with payoff U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(ϑ′) = UL˜(ϑ′) at any ϑ′ ∈ [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)], since τ˜(ϑ′) = τ˜(ϑ)
a.s. (note that the endpoint condition ∆Gϑi (F −M) ≥ 0 at τG,ϑi (1) = inf{t ∈ R+ |Gϑi (t) = 1}
is void thanks to M ≤ F ).
If we want the respective maximal payoff to be attained in every subgame in one equi-
librium, we need to be careful how to aggregate the random intervals [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) – on which
to suppress α·i – in a measurable way across all ϑ ∈ T . Therefore, begin with the (op-
tional) set A := ⋃q∈Q+ [q, τ˜(q)). Now approximate any given ϑ ∈ T from above by the
decreasing sequence (ϑn)n∈N, where ϑn := 2−n d2nϑe ∈ T . Any ϑn takes values only in
{k2−n; k ∈ N¯} and thus [ϑn, τ˜(ϑn)) = ∑k∈N[k2−n, τ˜(k2−n))1ϑn=k2−n a.s., which means that
[ϑn, τ˜(ϑn)) belongs to A up to a nullset. Further, ϑn ≤ ϑ + 2−n implies τ˜(ϑ) = τ˜(ϑk) for all
k ≥ n on {τ˜(ϑ) ≥ ϑ + 2−n} a.s., and therefore on this set (ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) = ⋃k≥n[ϑk, τ˜(ϑk)) a.s.,
which means that (ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) belongs to A on {τ˜(ϑ) ≥ ϑ + 2−n} up to a nullset. Aggregating,
(ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) = (ϑ, τ˜(ϑ))
(
1τ˜(ϑ)≥2−1 +
∑
n 1τ˜(ϑ)∈[ϑ+2−n−1,ϑ+2−n)
)
a.s. and hence belongs to A up to
a nullset.
Now define
α˜ϑi :=
(
lim sup
u↘t
1u∈Ac
)
αϑi
for any ϑ ∈ T , with αϑi as in Proposition 7.1, i = 1, 2. α˜ϑi does not depend on ϑ and is still
progressively measurable by Theorem IV.33 (c) in Dellacherie and Meyer (1978). Further,
α˜ϑi = 0 on [ϑ, τ˜(ϑ)) a.s. It remains to verify right-continuity (where α˜ϑi < 1) for a subgame-
perfect equilibrium along the previous lines, and that τ˜(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ τ˜(ϑ) | α˜ϑi (t) > 0} a.s.
Consider the set {lim supu↘σ 1u∈Ac 6= lim infu↘σ 1u∈Ac} for some σ ∈ T . We cannot
have Lσ < Fσ on that set with positive probability, because then we would have τ˜(σ) ≥
inf{t ≥ σ |Ft > Lt} > σ and lim supu↘σ 1u∈Ac = 0. We cannot have Lσ > Fσ with positive
probability, either, because then limu↘σ 1u∈Ac would exist. Indeed, we would have
τ˜(q) ≥ inf{t ≥ σ |Ft − Fσ ≥ (Lσ − Fσ)/3 or Lt − Lσ ≤ −(Lσ − Fσ)/3} =: σ′
for all [q, τ˜(q)) ∩ (σ, σ′) 6= ∅ a.s. by Lσ > sup[σ,σ′)(L ∧ F ), which means that there cannot
be shorter and shorter intervals in A as we approach σ from the right. In summary, we only
possibly affect right-continuity of αϑi < 1 by moving to α˜ϑi where L = F and αϑi > 0, but
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there αϑi = 1 by definition.
Finally, if we consider a (rationally valued, as above) sequence ϑn ↘ τ˜(ϑ), then (B.18)
implies lim supu↘τ˜(ϑ) 1u∈Ac = 1 a.s., and (B.17) implies τ˜(ϑ) = inf{t ≥ τ˜(ϑ) | α˜ϑi (t) > 0} a.s.
by the definition of αϑi .
Now we can define G˜ϑi := Gϑi , G˜ϑj := Gϑj as in Theorem 5.1 with τϑ := τ˜(ϑ) for any ϑ ∈ T .
These strategies form a subgame-perfect equilibrium analogously to Theorem 7.3 with payoff
U(L∧F )τ˜(ϑ)(ϑ) = UL˜(ϑ) at any ϑ ∈ T .
C Outcome probabilities
The following definition is a simplification of that in Riedel and Steg (2014), resulting from
right-continuity of any αϑi (·) also where it takes the value 0.
Define the functions µL and µM from [0, 1]2 \ (0, 0) to [0, 1] by
µL(x, y) :=
x(1− y)
x+ y − xy and µM (x, y) :=
xy
x+ y − xy .
µL(ai, aj) is the probability that player i stops first in an infinitely repeated stopping game
where i plays constant stage stopping probabilities ai and player j plays constant stage
probabilities aj . µM (ai, aj) is the probability of simultaneous stopping and 1 − µL(ai, aj) −
µM (ai, aj) = µL(aj , ai) that of player j stopping first.
Definition C.1. Given ϑ ∈ T and a pair of extended mixed strategies (Gϑ1 , αϑ1) and (Gϑ2 , αϑ2),
the outcome probabilities λϑL,1, λϑL,2 and λϑM at τˆϑ := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑ1 (t)+αϑ2 (t) > 0} are defined
as follows. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
If τˆϑ < τˆϑj := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑj (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ)
)
,
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)
αϑi (τˆϑ)∆Gϑj (τˆϑ).
If τˆϑ < τˆϑi := inf{t ≥ ϑ |αϑi (t) > 0}, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)(
1− αj(τˆϑ)
)
∆Gϑi (τˆϑ),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
αϑj (τˆϑ)∆Gϑi (τˆϑ).
If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 and αϑ1 (τˆϑ) + αϑ2 (τˆϑ) > 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
µL(αϑi (τˆϑ), αϑj (τˆϑ)),
λϑM :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
µM (αϑ1 (τˆϑ), αϑ2 (τˆϑ)).
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If τˆϑ = τˆϑ1 = τˆϑ2 and αϑ1 (τˆϑ) + αϑ2 (τˆϑ) = 0, then
λϑL,i :=
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
) 1
2
{
lim inf
t↘τˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(αϑi (t), αϑj (t))
+ lim sup
t↘τˆϑ
αϑ
i
(t)+αϑ
j
(t)>0
µL(αϑi (t), αϑj (t))
}
,
λϑM := 0.
Remark C.2.
(i) λϑM is the probability of simultaneous stopping at τˆϑ, while λϑL,i is the probability of
player i becoming the leader, i.e., that of player j becoming follower. It holds that
λϑM+λϑL,i+λϑL,j =
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
. Dividing by
(
1−Gϑi (τˆϑ−)
)(
1−Gϑj (τˆϑ−)
)
where feasible yields the corresponding conditional probabilities.
(ii) If any αϑ· = 1, then no limit argument is needed. Otherwise both αϑ· are right-continuous
and the corresponding limit of µM exists. µL, however, has no continuous extension at
the origin, whence we use the symmetric combination of lim inf and lim sup, ensuring
consistency whenever the limit does exist. If the limit in a potential equilibrium does
not exist, both players will be indifferent about the roles; see Lemma A.5 in Riedel and
Steg (2014).
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